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The Properties of Integration: Mixed-Income Housing 
as Discrimination Management   
Audrey G. McFarlane
ABSTRACT
Mixed-income housing is an increasingly popular approach to providing affordable housing.  The 
technique largely went unnoticed until developers of mixed-income housing constructed buildings 
containing separate entrances for rich and poor residents.  The ensuing “poor door” controversy 
illustrated that mixed-income housing, as both a method of affordable housing production and 
an integration strategy, is in unacknowledged tension with itself.  This Article argues that, mixed-
income housing is implemented as a surreptitious form of racial and economic integration that 
accommodates and replicates prevailing race and class assumptions detrimental to the needs and 
interests of low to moderate-income individuals in need of housing.  The mixed-income housing 
strategy, at its heart, serves as a form of discrimination management—a way to work around the 
race and class discriminatory impulses of residents within a development and within a particular 
jurisdiction.  The paper recommends ways in which to think more critically about this important 
question of community design in ways that account more honestly for the limits and possibilities 
of how we may choose to use affordable housing for race and class integration.
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INTRODUCTION 
“I do not think this country can solve its urban problems, the 
problems which we face in the American cities, until we take the 
simple step of agreeing that we are going to live together, not 
separately.”1 
“The value and meaning of good neighbors…are one part of the 
larger story of the moral uses of pluralism.”2 
“Cities are difference engines, and one of the qualities they assign 
is the place of class in space.”3 
“Do I really want to be integrated into a burning house?”4 
 
Rampant development and gentrification have transformed parts of 
many inner cities into fabulous, expensive places to live, accessible to those 
with the money to pay.5  Cities have welcomed this influx of the affluent as an 
indicator of the success of local economic development policy: they’ve 
succeeded in attracting people with resources to live, work and play.6  Yet one 
need not look far to see that this market-based success has been accompanied 
by displacement and exclusion.  The high cost of housing in some areas is out 
of reach for low-, moderate-, and even some upper-income residents.  With 
federal housing support in decline, a number of cities around the country (and 
across the globe) are seeking to ease the transformation by encouraging new 
housing developments to “mix in” some housing units that are comparatively 
affordable into otherwise market rate developments.7  The costs of these 
below-market price units are often offset by lucrative regulatory waivers or 
 
1. 114 CONG. REC. S2993 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale). 
2. NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, GOOD NEIGHBORS: THE DEMOCRACY OF EVERYDAY LIFE IN 
AMERICA 13 (2016). 
3. Michael Sorkin, What’s Behind the ‘Poor Door’?, NATION (April 2, 2014), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/whats-behind-poor-door [https://perma.cc/UA3R-74WR]. 
4. JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 108 (1963). 
5. See Saskia Sassen, Who Owns Our Cities—And Why This Urban Takeover Should Concern Us 
All, GUARDIAN (Nov. 24, 2015, 3:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015 
/nov/24/who-owns-our-cities-and-why-this-urban-takeover-should-concern-us-all 
[https://perma.cc/FH4N-XEXP]. 
6. See generally Neil Smith, New Globalism, New Urbanism: Gentrification as Global Urban 
Strategy, 34 Antipode 427 (2002). 
7. See generally INCLUSIONARY HOUSING IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING, SOCIAL INCLUSION, AND LAND VALUE RECAPTURE (Nico Calavita & Alan 
Mallach eds., 2010). 
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tax breaks.8  This mixed-income policy has also been adopted on the opposite 
end of the housing spectrum—the federal government is redeveloping 
exclusively low-income public housing to be economically mixed.9  For the 
most part, mixed-income housing is regarded favorably; many attractive, 
well-designed developments have been and are being built without 
controversy.10  Yet mixed-income housing as a policy for how housing should 
be built has not been thoroughly examined for some hidden yet troubling 
problems.   
An indication of the hidden problems surfaced when developers of 
mixed-income residential developments opted to physically separate the 
wealthier residents from the lower-income residents by building separate 
entrances to their buildings—a luxury entrance with a doorman, concierge, 
and valet and a less elaborate, perfectly functional, entrance with a lock.11  In 
other buildings, amenities like exercise facilities were off limits to the lower-
income residents even if they were able to pay.12  Separate entrances were 
 
8. See Samuel Stein, Progress for Whom, Toward What?  Progressive Politics and New York 
City’s Mandatory Inclusionary Housing, 40 J. URB. AFF. 770 (2017); Ajay Garde, 
Affordable by Design?  Inclusionary Housing Insights From Southern California, 36 J. 
PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 16 (2016) (suggesting other incentives such as design flexibility and 
expedited processing). 
9. See EDWARD G. GOETZ, NEW DEAL RUINS: RACE, ECONOMIC JUSTICE, AND PUBLIC HOUSING 
POLICY (2013); Robert C. Ellickson, The False Promise of the Mixed-Income Housing Project, 
57 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1020 (2010) (noting the trend towards mixed income projects since the early 
1970s);  OFFICE POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., Confronting 
Concentrated Poverty with a Mixed-Income Strategy, EVIDENCE MATTERS (Spring 2013), 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/em/spring13/highlight1.html#title 
[https://perma.cc/RJJ4-QHDD].  
10. But some developers complain that the inclusionary housing schemes that embody the 
mixed income principle come at the expense of their profits.  See, e.g., 616 Croft Ave., 
L.L.C. v. City of West Hollywood, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016); Cal. Bldg. 
Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974 (Cal. 2015). 
11. For example, in London, developers produced a brochure for One Commercial Street on 
the edge of the area of London called “the City”, which promising a “bespoke entrance 
lobby . . .  With the ambiance of a stylish hotel reception area [that] creates a stylish yet 
secure transition space between your home and the City streets.”  Hilary Osborne, Poor 
Doors: The Segregation of London’s Inner-City Flat Dwellers, GUARDIAN (July 25, 2014, 
2:46 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2014/jul/25/poor-doors-segregation-
london-flats [https://perma.cc/52KP-QQS8] (noting “[e]ven bicycle storage spaces, 
rubbish disposal facilities and postal deliveries are being separated”). 
12. See, e.g., Melkorka Licea, ‘Poor Door’ Tenants of Luxury Tower Reveal the Financial Apartheid 
Within, NY POST  (Jan. 17, 2016, 1:48 AM) https://nypost.com/2016/01/17/poor-door-tenants-
reveal-luxury-towers-financial-apartheid [https://perma.cc/FPC9-S575] (lower-income tenants 
apartments look out on courtyard they are forbidden to use); Ronda Kaysen, What’s Next, a 
Bouncer?, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/18/realestate/rent-
regulated-tenants-excluded-from-amenities.html [https://perma.cc/5HUM-KMQL] (rent regulated 
tenants prevented from using building amenities possibly to encourage them to move); Bryce 
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considered necessary to maintain exclusivity for the wealthier residents, who 
sometimes paid millions of dollars for their units, while the lower-income 
residents rented units for only several hundred dollars per month.13  Public 
reaction to media reports about the separate entrances, or the poor door as it 
was referred to,14 was swift and condemning.15  Separately designated 
entrances were widely perceived as a modern iteration of separate and 
unequal, a demeaning, discriminatory practice from the era of de jure 
segregation.16  A form of housing development initially perceived as inclusive 
and morally just was now deemed unjust as it turned lower-income residents 
into second-class citizens in their own communities.  Others, however, 
shrugged off the suggestion that there was any problem with this 
arrangement—separation based on ability to pay was “rational” and, 
moreover, made sorely needed access to affordable housing in centrally 
located places available.17 
Poor doors may be merely a symptom of a larger problem of how we are 
choosing to build housing based on market preferences, while also aspiring to 
economically integrate in a society shaped by racial segregation and 
discrimination.  What if the problem arose from those market driven 
preferences and practices (often premised on exclusion) being married with 
 
Covert, Luxury Apartment Building Will Have Separate Door for Poor Residents, THINK 
PROGRESS (July 21, 2014, 1:01 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/luxury-apartment-building-will-
have-separate-door-for-poor-residents-f0449766d474 [https://perma.cc/Q6XF-8NKL].  See 
generally Lauren C. Wittlin, Access Denied: The Tale of Two Tenants and Building 
Amenities, 31 TOURO L. REV. 615 (2015) (arguing tenants should have access to building 
amenities through rent regulation prescribing a reasonable fee.).  
13. See Mireya Navarro, ‘Poor Door’ in a New York Tower Opens a Fight Over Affordable 
Housing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2014) https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/27 
/nyregion/separate-entryways-for-new-york-condo-buyers-and-renters-create-an-
affordable-housing-dilemma.html [https://perma.cc/F2JT-JG7L]; Osborne, supra note 11. 
14. Covert, supra note 12. 
15. See, e.g., Lucy Westcott, New York City Approves ‘Poor Door’ for Luxury Apartment 
Building, NEWSWEEK (July 21, 2014, 5:49 PM), www.newsweek.com/new-york-city-approves-
poor-door-luxury-apartment-building-260218 [https://perma.cc/HPN9-WABZ]. 
16. Id. 
17. See e.g., Rick Jacobus, In Defense of the ‘Poor Door’, SHELTERFORCE (Oct. 14, 2015) 
https://shelterforce.org/2015/10/14/in_defense_of_the_poor_door/ [https://perma.cc/32NJ-
FJN3]; Carol Lamberg, Housing Priorities: Quality is More Important than the Number of 
Entrances, DREAM REVISITED (March 2015) http://furmancenter.org/research/iri/essay/housing-
priorities-quality-is-more-important-than-the-number-of-entrances [https://perma.cc/5ZZX-
NXWB].  Mixed-income housing has even made it into film.  See Kate Wilson, Film: High Rise, 
VARSITY (Oct. 9, 2015, 5:34 PM), https://www.varsity.co.uk/reviews/8948 
[https://perma.cc/JK22-DVJ3] (describing mixed-income high rise where the elite live at 
the top and the “commoners” live on the lower floors with competition to rise in the 
social hierarchy causing the community to “descend[] into anarchy”). 
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an effort to integrate (a policy of inclusion)?  Then certainly the poor door 
controversy reflects a problem with the underlying strategy of mixed-income 
housing, an increasingly popular policy approach to provide both housing 
integration and access to the city. 
Mixed-income housing involves newly built buildings or communities that 
contain units affordable to the wealthy as well as to moderate- and low-income 
residents.  The affordable units evince an economic integration strategy that can 
involve a mix of incomes as well as a mix of ownership arrangements.18  
Mixed-income housing embodies the highest ideals for an integrated 
society—mutual understanding through diversity of neighbors in all stations 
of life.  Beyond the controversy of separate doors for the wealthy and the 
nonwealthy, the debate over desirable or acceptable housing arrangements 
invites us to examine the greater project and policy goals of mixed-income 
housing itself.  Mixed-income housing policy is at the unacknowledged center 
of an unresolved tension between our aspirations for inclusion in the face of 
a society and economy structured around separation, differentiation, and 
exclusion.  With much of society’s arrangements premised on segregation, at 
best, only a part of our societal instinct is towards mixing.  Arrangements as 
fundamental and seemingly benign as our zoning system are based on 
separation and class sorting—exclusion as well as uniformity of uses within a 
particular zoning district—and real estate and other markets premised on 
differentiation.19  Our aspiration today may be mixing, yet land use and other 
law, as well as societal practices, have empowered separation.20 
While it is generally not understood as such, mixed-income housing is a 
poor door strategy itself.  In a neoliberal, market-based conception of society, 
mixed-income housing provides entrance to places off limits to people who 
would otherwise be shut out.  It is a way for the lower income and often, racial 
minority groups, to gain access to housing in central places in the face of 
growing housing shortages.  It is also a tactical strategy to circumvent 
 
18. See Anouk K. Tersteeg, Fenne M. Pinkster, “Us Up Here and Them Down There”: How 
Design, Management, and Neighborhood Facilities Shape Social Distance in a Mixed-
Tenure Housing Development, 52 URB. AFF. REV. 751 (2016). 
19. See generally Marion Fourcade & Kieran Healy, Classification Situations: Life-Chances in 
the Neoliberal Era, 42 HIST. SOCIAL RES. 23 (2017) (discussing the use of actuarial scores 
to classify people for consumer credit, insurance, real estate and employment creating 
markets that structure individual life chances); Annette B. Kolis, Citadels of Privilege: 
Exclusionary Land Use Regulations and the Presumption of Constitutional Validity, 8 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 585 (1981) (reviewing  exclusionary land use regulatory devices 
and arguing they should not be subject to the traditional deferential standards of review).  
20. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 
(2007); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
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objections to affordable housing development by, in effect, unobtrusively 
ushering the poor into otherwise affluent developments.  Mixed-income 
housing also quietly uses economic integration to respond to residential racial 
segregation.  The racial integration we pursue today is the problem that was 
not solved by the Fair Housing Act: segregation of Black, lower-income 
people, the non-middle class.21  The type of housing needed is not being 
constructed in sufficient numbers.  Stigmatized Black racial identity is 
combined with the stigma of low income in a capitalist society.22  Since 1968, 
non-middle class racial integration in housing has been persistently yet 
unsuccessfully sought—a goal now made even further elusive by rising 
economic inequality.23  Paradoxically, rising inequality is accompanied by an 
attachment by many to consumption of material goods, such as housing, to 
provide economic status and identity.  For this and other reasons, the stakes 
are high when it comes to housing.  One’s self concept, one’s shelter, and likely 
one’s largest financial investment are all tied up in housing.  Access to the 
perceived good life is premised on wealth.  Wealth, and who does or does not 
have it in the United States, is stubbornly tied to race.  Racial segregation has 
manifested in the persistence of hyper-impoverished neighborhoods that are 
burdened with terrible economic and health statistics.24  Since 1968, this race-
based class segregation has proven so intractable that sophisticated mobility 
strategies premised on mixed-income housing have proven necessary to allow 
individuals to navigate around the exclusionary metropolis.25 
Mixed-income housing and its integrationist goal face many challenges 
that have been inadequately addressed.  Because the policy was designed, in 
part, as a surreptitious workaround to objections to low-income housing,26 
this paper argues that the policy has also by necessity had to accommodate 
enduring expectations and practices for race and class separation and 
 
21. The Fair Housing Act of 1968 succeeded mainly in freeing black middle- and upper-class people 
to live in areas where they had the money to purchase.  See infra text accompanying notes 
163–170. 
22. See generally IYIOLA SOLANKE, DISCRIMINATION AS STIGMA: A THEORY OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION 
LAW (2017) (providing a detailed analysis of stigma being at the heart of discrimination 
that should be protected against under law). 
23. See generally PETER TEMIN, THE VANISHING MIDDLE CLASS: PREJUDICE AND POWER IN A 
DUAL ECONOMY 129–31 (2017) (attributing a dual residential system to rising economic 
inequality). 
24. See Douglas S. Massey & Jonathan Tannen, A Research Note on Trends in Black 
Hypersegregation, 52 DEMOGRAPHY 1025 (2015). 
25. See Patrick Sharkey, Residential Mobility and the Reproduction of Unequal Neighborhoods, 14 
CITYSCAPE 9 (2012). 
26. See Alexander POLIKOFF, WAITING FOR GAUTREAUX 352(2006) (describing the ways in 
which suburban towns exclude affordable housing). 
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exclusion.  The poor door controversy dramatically illustrates that mixed-income 
communities defer to discrimination by implicitly taking race and class 
preferences into account when designing new developments, as well as in 
zoning rules that set minimum percentage thresholds for inclusionary units.  
Both internally within the residential product created and externally to the 
surrounding host community, mixed-income housing is both a response to 
and tacit embrace of discrimination.  It incorporates discrimination’s norms 
and assumptions, and then seeks to manage it.  Such discrimination 
management seems realistic and expedient; but right now, efforts to manage 
discrimination operate within in a vacuum that has not considered the 
implications nor consequences of accepting such discrimination.   
As the mixed-income principle in housing has grown from voluntary 
state inclusionary laws to the preferred approach in federal housing policy, 
there has been little to no examination of mixed-income housing’s origins as 
a response to racial segregation, it’s normative goals, or the race and class 
assumptions embedded in how we define a good community.  Little 
normative guidance exists for how existing discrimination should be 
managed.  This paper argues that when the goal is integration, rigorously 
identifying integration’s reasonably expected benefits should guide 
discrimination management.  As the discussion will show, this is more 
difficult than it sounds since integration comes with paradoxical challenges.  
One significant challenge is that segregation is highly valued and reflects a 
concerted effort to maintain social domination.27  This reality suggests that 
discrimination management should not disadvantage the group presumably 
targeted to benefit from these schemes.  At the very least, discrimination 
management should be openly discussed and interrogated to ensure that the 
housing policy of our time does not replicate the very assumptions and 
structures that subordinate the purported beneficiaries of inclusionary, 
mixed-income housing programs.  Developing antisubordination norms for 
discrimination management in this context requires situating mixed-income 
housing within the context that lead to its genesis—a response to racial 
segregation and segregation’s quest for maintenance of social domination and 
efforts to promote the creation of integrative affordable housing.  Only then 
can we consider both the promising and troubling aspects of the segregated 
society reflected in mixed-income housing schemes. 
The poor door controversy offers a timely opportunity to consider the 
tension inherent in our present version of the inclusive city—one of 
 
27. See infra text accompanying notes 88–92. 
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separation and segregation based on ability to pay combined with a fixation 
on luxury and exclusivity.  In this context, mixed-income housing may be 
both the right and the wrong way to address segregation.  Right in the sense 
that it responds to the constraints of present realities.  Wrong because it fails 
to honestly consider society’s acceptance and incorporation of segregation.  In 
light of how persistent segregation is, it is important to consider the needs 
segregation fulfills and which of segregation’s values we actually reject.  The 
quick answer would be racism certainly.  But we too often consider racism to 
be merely about attitudes rather than structural or systemic.  We often fail to ask 
why racism is so structurally embedded in all aspects of society.  Social 
domination theory provides helpful insight into how and why segregation is 
valued.  The poor door can then properly be understood and assessed within 
a social and legal context that embraces both integrationist aspirations and 
segregated realities embedded within markets. 
Part I of this Article discusses the poor door controversy and the clash it 
reflects between the competing values of housing as access (to material goods 
like shelter) and housing as a psychic good (consisting of status derived from 
living in a community that is exclusive to those who are similarly situated).  
Part II of the Article explains why it is important to understand that structural 
racism, in the form of racial segregation, is at the heart of mixed-income 
housing policy.  This Part demonstrates how concerted efforts over the 
twentieth century to racially segregate reflect an unquestioned need for social 
domination and thus presents a formidable obstacle to dismantling racialized 
housing.  Part III of the paper critiques mixed-income housing as a form of 
discrimination management.  Because mixed-income policy surreptitiously 
addresses racial segregation under cover of the more politically expedient goal 
of economic integration, it renders invisible the policy’s deliberate choices to 
manage discrimination, its perpetuation of racial subordination and its very 
real consequences. 
I. THE POOR DOOR CONTROVERSY 
In 2014, the planned construction of a luxury residential condominium 
tower in New York City captured the public’s attention for a very unusual 
reason.  The 219 unit building, intended for a high-income clientele with the 
units marketed at a price point of approximately $1 million to $26 million, 
included amenities such as “a gym, a swimming pool, a bowling alley, a rock-
climbing wall, an indoor playground, a squash court, [and] a golf 
Discrimination Management  1149 
simulator . . . .”28  Even though the building was privately built and intended 
to house the very high end of the real estate market, the developer took 
advantage of a number of available tax incentive programs under which, inter 
alia, property taxes were abated for a number of years.29  In return for the 
valuable tax benefits, the developer was obliged to list a percentage of the units in 
the building at a price point affordable to low- and moderate-income renters.30  
This type of inclusionary requirement uses existing zoning regulations to 
encourage affordable housing construction wherever centrally located, 
market rate housing is built.31  Approximately 27 states and the District of 
Columbia have adopted mandatory or voluntary Inclusionary Housing 
programs.32  The ordinances typically offer tax incentives and regulatory 
waivers that allow developers to increase profit by increasing the height and 
bulk of their developments, allowing them to build more units than would 
otherwise be permissible under governing zoning ordinances.33  Mixed-
income housing has also been prioritized in the redevelopment of public 
housing in the Hope VI program.34  As the biggest source of funding for 
affordable housing development today, the federal Low Income Housing Tax 
Credit program reflects a mixed-income housing policy goal as well.35 
 
28. Navarro, supra note 13. 
29. See generally ALESSANDRO BUSÀ, THE CREATIVE DESTRUCTION OF NEW YORK CITY: 
ENGINEERING THE CITY FOR THE ELITE 65 (2017) (describing the impact of New York 
City’s 421-a tax abatement program on the proliferation of luxury housing).  See also 
Robert Hickey et al., Achieving Lasting Affordability Through Inclusionary Housing 
18 (Lincoln Inst. Land Pol’y, Working Paper No. WP14RH1, 2014), 
https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/achieving-lasting-affordability-
through-inclusionary-housing-full.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9B2-D2FF] (noting that to date, 
twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia have adopted inclusionary zoning 
ordinances).  
30. See generally Seth B. Cohen, Teaching an Old Policy New Tricks: The 421-A Tax Program 
and the Flaws of Trickle-Down Housing, 16 J.L. & POL'Y 757, 772 (2008) (describing the 
available abatements under New York City’s inclusionary housing program).    
31. See id. at 18 (analyzing a set of twenty inclusionary housing programs).  See also OFFICE POLICY DEV. 
& RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., Inclusionary Zoning and Mixed-Income 
Communities, EVIDENCE MATTERS (Spring 2013) https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals 
/em/spring13/highlight3.html#title [https://perma.cc/78PU-UTJX]. 
32. See generally Hickey et al., supra note 29. 
33. See Audrey G. McFarlane & Randall K. Johnson, Cities, Inclusion and Exactions, 102 
IOWA L. REV. 2145, 2157 (2017).  
34. Lawrence J. Vale & Shomon Shamsuddin, All Mixed Up: Making Sense of Mixed-Income 
Housing Developments, 83 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 56 (2017). 
35. Raquel Smith, A Seat at the Table: Changing the Governing Structure of Low Income 
Housing Tax Credit Program Administration to Reflect Civil Rights Values and Fair 
Housing, 6 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 193, 199 (2016). 
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Developers are often allowed, in return, to build taller building 
containing a greater number of units (density bonuses) or receive tax breaks 
that allow the developer, in theory to recoup costs of the income foregone for 
the required percentage of inclusionary units.  One could call the market rate 
units unsubsidized, but in fact the market units were subsidized as well 
through the tax abatement.  Such units that are set aside for rental by low- or 
moderate-income residents and are often built with cheaper finishes and 
fewer amenities within the unit.36  Outside of the unit, however, the 
inclusionary units are indistinguishable from the market rate units and are 
typically supposed to be unobtrusively mixed in throughout the development.  
It is not uncommon for some inclusionary zoning laws to allow developers to opt 
out of inclusionary requirements, allowing them to instead build units off site 
(in another location), or instead the developer may contribute to an affordable 
housing fund.37  For example, the New York City (NYC) program allowed 
developers to receive tax breaks if they offered affordable housing at the site 
or within a half mile of the site.38 
In contrast to the typical inclusionary yet unobtrusive dispersal 
approach, the Extell Building’s developer took advantage of an amendment to 
the NYC rules which allowed the units to be grouped together in one area of 
the building, “in an attached segment of the building.”39  The developer 
planned to build a separate entrance for the affordable units all located in one 
lower corner of the building.  This section was walled off from access to the 
 
36. See, e.g., URBAN INST., EXPANDING HOUSING OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH INCLUSIONARY ZONING: 
LESSONS FROM TWO COUNTIES (2012), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/HUD-
496_new.pdf [https://perma.cc/KVK9-7H3R].  
37. See, e.g., Tim Iglesias, Framing Inclusionary Zoning: Exploring the Legality of Local 
Inclusionary Zoning and Its Potential to Meet Affordable Housing Needs, 36 ZONING & 
PLAN. L. REP. 1, 4 (2013). 
38. Alexandra Schwartz, The “Poor Door” and The Glossy Reconfiguration of City Life, NEW 
YORKER (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/the-
poor-door-and-the-glossy-reconfiguration-of-city-life [https://perma.cc/NQ8B-ZCYL].  But 
see Emily Badger, When Separate Doors for The Poor Are More Than They Seem, WASH. POST 
(July 31, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/07/31/when-the-poor-
want-their-own-door [https://perma.cc/RU5H-8WXL] (describing “Portner Place, a complex of 
garden-style Section 8 apartments . . . [in] Washington, D.C . . . . slated for redevelopment into a 
roughly 350-unit mixed-income property that will include two wings: one for market-rate 
professionals eager to live near the U Street scene, and the other for Portner Place’s existing 
residents, plus another 48 units of affordable housing meant for households making less 
than 60 percent of the area median income.  The wings will have separate entrances, off 
separate streets.  Portner Place’s current tenants requested this.”). 
39. Shannon Ayala, Upper West Side Board Is Crafting an Anti-Poor Door Proposal, CURBED N.Y. 
(Oct. 10, 2014, 1:40 PM), http://ny.curbed.com/2014/10/10/10037458/upper-west-side-board-
is-crafting-an-anti-poor-door-proposal [https://perma.cc/5WFV-7A9W].   
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main part of the building that contained the luxury amenities and from 
interaction with the market rate tenants.40  The City approved the plans that 
included the wealthy apartments facing the water and the poor apartments 
having an entrance in the back, facing the street.41  The two sets of residents 
would have two different entrances—a luxury entrance for the 219 market 
rate condos, where unit owners would have a doorman, concierge and valet, 
while the entrance for the fifty-five income-restricted, rental unit tenants42 
would be separate and less elaborate with just a lock on the front door.43  
A public uproar ensued.  The term “poor door” was coined to poke fun and 
point a shaming finger at exclusionary practices that were themselves shaming.  Not 
only was the public shocked at the separate door arrangement, members of the 
public seemed doubly offended because the developer would receive tax 
credits and highly lucrative permission to build a taller building in return for 
providing more modest, income restricted, affordable units in the 
development.44  There was a sense that what the developer had done was 
repugnant—he had essentially segregated a new community, seemingly 
placing us on a slippery slope towards the old practices of separate but 
unequal treatment—separate entrances, water fountains, public restroom, 
seating areas in restaurants, sitting in the back of buses.  It also resonated with 
the sense of exclusion even the middle class are feeling in an expensive global 
city like New York.45 
 
40. See Daniel R. Jones, We Need Stronger Rent Laws, Not Developer Giveaways, URB. 
AGENDA (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.cssny.org/news/entry/we-need-stronger-rent-laws-
not-developer-giveaways [https://perma.cc/GZS7-SW28] (brief description of the 
history of the genesis and inefficiencies of the 421—a tax incentive program which was 
“created in the 1970s at a time when private residential construction in the city had 
collapsed . . . .  By the 1980s, any justification for the program was . . . weak.  But the 
city’s powerful real estate industry was not about to part ways with the subsidy.  So 
legislators found a way to keep the program alive by adding “affordability” requirements 
and thereby giving it a new justification”). 
41. In response to the uproar, the quality of the door finishes was upgraded to include a glass 
façade and “custom-wood” and to face a planned public park instead of the side street.  
Laura Kusisto, A ‘Poor Door’ on a Planned New York Apartment Tower with Affordable 
Housing Gets a Makeover, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 29, 2014, 9:37 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-poor-door-on-a-planned-new-york-apartment-tower-
with-affordable-housing-gets-a-makeover-1409276266 [https://perma.cc/CRR8-36JC]. 
42. New UWS Development Could Have Separate Entrance for Poorer People, WEST SIDE RAG (Aug. 
12, 2013, 2:30 PM), http://www.westsiderag.com/2013/08/12/new-uws-development-could-
have-separate-entrance-for-poorer-people [https://perma.cc/E2AD-XEZG]. 
43. Id.  
44. Id. 
45. Some argue that the middle class and affluent benefit the most from affordable housing 
programs:   
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The Extell building became the lightning rod of the rising inequality in a 
city experiencing rapid, hyper gentrification with prices rising above a price 
point that upper-income people would find unaffordable. Unbeknownst to 
the New York public, other buildings in the City quietly used the poor doors 
as well.46  For example, in an already existing building in New York with 
separate entrances, one 34-year-old bank employee tenant who wanted to 
remain anonymous for fear of jeopardizing her one-bedroom rental 
complained: “We can’t even use the pool or the gym.  I’ve asked and offered 
to pay.  It’s kind of messed up.”47 48  And poor doors have been an international 
inclusionary housing problem.  For example, Vancouver, Canada, quietly used 
poor doors, until the controversy in New York sparked a debate in Vancouver.49  A 
similar building was also contemplated in Toronto.50  Similar buildings in 
London caused a large public outcry in the city including a protest march.51 
The London protests, which were centered on already completed 
projects, are useful for understanding some of the lived experience in 
buildings with poor doors.  The setting for the London controversy is a hyper 
 
Take Manhattan’s 606 West 57th Street, a 1025-unit building to be put up 
by developer TF Cornerstone.  In exchange for setting aside 220 of those 
apartments for ‘lower income’ tenants, the developer will get a local real 
estate tax exemption, tax-exempt financing, Low Income Housing Tax 
Credits (in which banks kick in equity in exchange for a tax rebate), and 
permission to build a larger building than the zoning code would otherwise 
allow.  
 Jim Epstein, New York City’s Affordable Housing Bonanza for The Rich, REASON (July 3, 
2014, 4:31 PM), http://reason.com/archives/2014/07/03/new-york-citys-affordable-
housing-bonanz [https://perma.cc/ME8D-GQTG] 
46. Brentin Mock, No More ‘Poor Doors’ in NYC, CITYLAB (July 1, 2015), 
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2015/07/no-more-poor-doors-in-nyc/397499 
[https://perma.cc/7KL7-V5BU] (describing planned mixed-income development that will use 
separate buildings: “In Brooklyn, developers of the Greenpoint Landing project are 
preserving three of its planned 10 buildings for units subsidized for low-income tenants.  
Those three buildings will contain 300 affordable units.  When all of the buildings are 
complete, some wealthier residents will not have to share vestibules with poorer 
neighbors, though they will live within the same complex.”). 
47. Navarro, supra note 13. 
48. Id.  
49. Jeff Lee, New Vancouver Highrise to Have Separate Door for Social Housing, VANCOUVER SUN 
(May 5, 2015) http://www.vancouversun.com/Vancouver+highrise+have+separate 
+door+social+housing/11031424/story.html [https://perma.cc/QDS9-CLPG]. 
50. Jessica Smith Cross, Separate Entrances: Are New York-style ‘Poor Doors’ Here in Toronto 
Already?, TORONTO METRO (Sep. 3, 2014), http://www.metronews.ca/news/toronto/2014 
/09/03/separate-entrances-are-new-york-style-poor-doors-here-in-toronto-already.html 
[https://perma.cc/RR6C-DB39].  See Martine August, Revitalisation Gone Wrong: Mixed-
Income Public Housing Redevelopment in Toronto’s Don Mount Court, 53 URB. STUD. 16 (2016). 
51. See generally, Chris Low, Developers Installed 'Poor Doors' and 'Rich Doors' On a Block of London 
Flats, Vice News (Aug. 22, 2014) (noting protests in London over poor doors).   
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gentrification possibly worse than New York’s, that is largely putting the 
entire city out of the reach of all but the very wealthy.  The Grenfell Towers 
burnt shell, the site of many lives lost to fire, stands as a symbol of the dim 
prospects for the poor to remain in the neighborhoods that have gentrified 
around them.52  The context heightened the perception that poor doors 
represented a stigmatizing separate but unequal policy.  One London tenant of an 
existing building with a luxury entrance for the market rate tenants and a plain 
entrance for the lower-income tenants, explained the hurt of the separation: 
“We know our place,” Donna says bitterly, her eyes filling with 
tears.  “They’ve made sure of that.  It’s us and them.  I’ve never felt 
poorer in my life because of the way we’re kept apart.  “It’s not about 
the quality of the building.  I’m grateful for the help I’ve had from 
the housing association.  But being kept apart makes us feel like 
scum.  We’re second-class citizens.  I don’t want my kids thinking 
they deserve to be treated differently.  It’s humiliating and wrong.”  
Donna also claim[ed] her children have been “ridiculed and sworn 
at” by posh neighbors[.] (emphasis added)53 
No such overt conflict was reported in New York, yet the message there is 
palpable.  “Buildings that segregate entrances for lower-income and middle-class 
tenants are an affront to our values,” said Manhattan Borough President Gale 
Brewer.54  According to Assemblywoman Linda Rosenthal: 
This ‘separate but equal’ arrangement is abominable and has no 
place in the 21st century, let alone on the Upper West Side . . . .  A 
mandatory affordable housing plan is not license to segregate 
lower-income tenants from those who are well-off.  The developer 
must follow the spirit as well the letter of the law when building 
 
52. A West London tower block building, one of the last housing structures affordable to 
low-income residents, in a heavily gentrified area burned to the ground killing 71 
residents.  The cause of the fire was the purely aesthetic exterior cladding that acted like 
an accelerant, which, when combined with blocked passageways, resulted in a terrible 
loss of life and the homelessness for 209 families.  Sam Knight, The Year the Grenfell 
Tower Fire Revealed the Lie That Londoners Tell Themselves, NEW YORKER (Dec. 27, 
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/2017-in-review/the-year-the-grenfell-tower-
fire-revealed-the-lie-that-londoners-tell-themselves [https://perma.cc/TH63-QMXE]. 
53. Gemma Aldridge, ‘Poor Doors’ Scandal: Separate Entrances for Wealthy and Housing Association 
Tenants at Apartment Blocks, MIRROR (Aug. 2, 2014, 6:31 PM), 
https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/poor-doors-scandal-separate-entrances-3954389 
[https://perma.cc/DL2X-ACP4]. 
54. Cyril Josh Barker, City Approves ‘Poor Door’ for Affordable Housing Residents, AMSTERDAM 
NEWS, (July 24, 2014, 9:15 AM), http://amsterdamnews.com/news/2014/jul/24/city-approves-
poor-door/ [https://perma.cc/VP4M-3QQ6]. 
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affordable housing, and this plan is clearly not what was intended 
by the community.” 55 
But as certain as the critics have been that this poor door plan was 
objectionable on its face, there were equal, if not greater, numbers of others who 
questioned why the separate doors were considered a problem.  This was 
reinforced by the results of the lottery that was held for the fifty-five units available 
in the Extell building.  Approximately 88,000 people applied for one of the 
apartments.56  An affordable apartment, even under possibly demeaning 
circumstances, was a worthwhile tradeoff in an impossibly tight and expensive 
real estate market.  Thus, there have been a variety of responses to the poor door 
controversy and whether such separate entrances are objectionable or justifiable 
as discussed below.  
A. The Technical, Rationalist Response 
Notwithstanding the headlines, the predominant argument in the poor 
door debate was that the separate doors had nothing to do with an effort by 
the developer to exclude, but simply reflected a necessary configuration in 
order to make the deal work financially.  Because the project was subject to 
often competing regulatory requirements for different sources of subsidy, the 
implicit argument was that the exclusion was out of developers’ hands.  
Accordingly, the developers repeatedly asserted that the affordable housing 
section of the building was a “legally separate entity.”57  First, in order to get 
the density bonus for including the affordable housing unit the developer 
needed the proportion of extremely low-income tenants to be 60 percent.58  
 
55. WEST SIDE RAG, supra note 42. 
56. Mireya Navarro, 88,000 Applicants and Counting for 55 Units in ‘Poor Door’ Building, 
N.Y. TIMES (April 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/21/nyregion/poor-
door-building-draws-88000-applicants-for-55-rental-units.html 
[https://perma.cc/85SP-8F22]. 
57. The project also received a floor area bonus from the provision of affordable units, which 
the developer did not use to expand the floor area of the Extell Building, instead selling 
the bonus to other buildings within half a mile of the site.  See Letter from Howard 
Lowenstein, Extell Attorney, to Matthew Diller (June 4, 2013) (on file with author) (“The 
developer says that by building the affordable units it will earn credits allowing it to sell 
rights to other nearby developers that will let them add more floor area.”).  See also WEST 
SIDE RAG, supra note 42. 
58. See generally Seth B. Cohen, Teaching an Old Policy New Tricks: The 421-A Tax Program 
and the Flaws of Trickle-Down Housing, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 757, 764 (2008); Samuel Stein, Progress 
for Whom, Toward What?  Progressive Politics and New York City’s Mandatory Inclusionary 
Housing, 40 J. URB. AFF., 770 (describing the New York City 421-A program, a tax abatement 
program used to subsidize the Extell building). 
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For example, Low Income Housing Tax Credits require a certain percentage 
of a building to be dedicated to very low to low-income housing.59  But, 
apparently, this argument is not quite true.  Other inclusionary housing 
buildings had units mixed in within the entire development. 
The other concern might be that, particularly in a condominium 
building, the common charges are paid by unit owners.  Low-income 
residents could not afford to pay the maintenance charges and therefore they 
could not own condominium units.  But, this problem could easily be handled 
by the units being owned together as an entity while nevertheless being 
scattered throughout the building, or perhaps confined to the lower, less 
expensive, noisier floors. 
Perhaps the explanation is no more complicated than the developer had 
applied to participate in New York City’s Inclusionary Housing Program, 
making the project eligible for additional lucrative floor area in exchange for 
providing affordable housing units in the project or at another location.  That 
law had been explicitly amended to allow low-income units to be placed 
elsewhere than on site.  It may be that Extell simply took advantage of a 
deliberate loophole that allowed them the perceived benefit of locating lower-
income tenants out of sight and being able to market the building for its 
exclusiveness rather than inclusiveness. 
B. The Economic Realist Response 
Mixed-income housing posits that regardless of income, residents of a 
community will be indistinguishably economically integrated.60  As many 
voices that were raised in opposition to the separate and unequal poor door, there 
were a considerable number of others who found the poor door arrangement 
indistinguishable from the class distinctions that are made in private and 
public accommodations every day.  There are services provided by class on 
trains.  On airplanes first class is separated by a curtain from coach.61  Hotels 
 
59. Smith, supra note 35, at 200 (“For a period of fifteen years, a property owner must rent 
at least twenty percent of the project’s units to households with incomes at or below fifty 
percent of the area median gross income or rent at least forty percent of the units to 
households with incomes at or below sixty percent of the area median gross income in 
order to qualify for the [LIHTC] program.”). 
60. See Tim Iglesias, Maximizing Inclusionary Zoning’s Contributions to Both Affordable 
Housing and Residential Integration, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 585 (2015). 
61. Tanvi Misra, The Consequences of Airplane Classism, CITYLAB (May 2, 2016), 
https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2016/05/the-consequences-of-airplane-
classism/480813 [https://perma.cc/9GWL-QKTH] (stating flights with first-class cabins 
are more likely to cause passengers to act out). 
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are distinguished by the price point that reflects the high, medium, or low 
quality of services.  Also, neighborhoods and buildings are segregated by the 
expense of the building product.  In urban areas, though it is not often thought 
of as such, luxury buildings with doormen are a form of gated community.  If 
one wants entrée to a higher-class neighborhood, one need simply to pay.  
Free choice is only limited by one’s resources.  Thus, economic segregation 
appears reasonable, as you consume what you can afford. 
Perhaps the difference is the class distinction within one’s residence.  
Usually, class distinctions manifest outside of the home.  Also, the other class-
based distinctions are limited in time—a few hours on a train, plane, or in a 
hotel.  Home class-based distinctions are more permanent.  Living with the 
class distinction up close is much more difficult and potentially stigmatizing.  
This of course begs the question: If up close distinctions based on class and 
income are not tolerable, then why have mixed-income living arrangements 
in the first place?  Other values must be at play in order to arrive at such an 
approach that are contrary to our present orientation towards luxury and 
consumption that hides what is less than pleasant in our society behind a 
veneer of perfection.62   
C. The Pragmatic Advocacy Response 
The pragmatic response to the poor door controversy focused on the 
expediency of the poor door buildings creating much needed housing.  
Because the 88,000 people applying for the fifty-five spots have been so beaten 
down by the structural realities of segregated and unequal housing 
opportunities, they were willing to accept some stigmatization—perhaps they 
view the cost of stigma as being less than the cost of living in housing that is 
substandard and/or unaffordable.  In addition, the fifty-five lottery winners are 
located in an opportunity-rich neighborhood in terms of jobs, schools, and 
transportation.  The cities are only trying to offset the grievous problem of lack of 
affordable housing by incentivizing private developers to build mixed-income, 
inclusionary housing.  It seems a win-win because some is better than none—
these developments would not have any affordable housing.  If the developers 
complied by building separate entrances for market-rate unit and low-income 
unit tenants, then many seem to assume this is a negligible price for an affordable 
 
62. See MICHAEL SORKIN, VARIATIONS ON A THEME PARK: THE NEW AMERICAN CITY AND THE 
END OF PUBLIC SPACE (1992) (explaining how theme park concepts drive privatized urban 
development and shape and control expectations for an “experience” that does not admit 
the reality of a less than perfect, stratified society). 
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place to live.  As a matter of policy, the question remains whether one should have 
to endure stigma in order to obtain housing.  It would seem that it should be an 
unconstitutional condition to have to surrender one’s dignity for a privilege of 
being affordably housed.63 
D. Acceptable Market-Based Discrimination or Invalid  
Race and Class Discrimination? 
Mixed-income housing is an approach to housing that responds to 
several explicit and implicit dimensions of racial discrimination in land use.64  
In particular, this question arises wherever there is an appreciable black 
population, due to a long history of racial discrimination.  As I argued in an 
earlier article, these race differences often track class differences (for example, 
differences in socioeconomic status, income, and wealth) though not 
necessarily so.  Class is a racialized concept in the United States, and questions 
of economic justice are intertwined with racial justice.65  
 
63. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 
1415 (1989) (“The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions holds that government may 
not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, 
even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether.”). 
64. See generally Desmond S. King & Rogers M. Smith, Racial Orders in American Political 
Development, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 75–92 (2005) (suggesting a conceptual framework 
for understanding mixed-income housing and its lessons).  King and Smith argue that 
the proper mode of analysis is to consider the interaction of race and politics and the 
historical truth that systems of racial hierarchy have dominated United States politics. 
Id.  at 75.  Thus, we should consider housing policy in the United States, in general, and 
mixed-income housing policy in particular as reflecting two competing “racial 
institutional orders” with competing ideologies in which the balance of power has 
changed over time.  Id.  One is a “white supremacist” order and the other is an 
“egalitarian transformative” order.  Id. at 75–76.  According to King and Smith, “most 
political actors possess partly conflicting identities and interests . . . [which in 
combination with] preexisting contexts define the problems and options actors face . . . .”  
Id. at 76. 
65. Several scholars have discussed the intersection between racial justice and economic 
justice:  
 The literature has long acknowledged an intersection between race and 
class, but there has been little actual exploration of the meaning of this 
interaction and its significance for antidiscrimination theory . . . .  [R]ace, as the 
central barrier to a black person's opportunities, may change as class changes.  
Class is something that can be deployed in certain circumstances to deflect 
racial stigma and disadvantage suggests that race is inaccurately conceptualized 
as fixed or absolute.  It might instead be only nearly fixed and nearly absolute, a 
slight albeit noteworthy shift signaling issues that might have to be faced fully if 
and when improvement in economic conditions for Blacks continues.  Class is 
conceptualized or mythologized as fluid because it can be manipulated by 
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Thus, even in supposedly race neutral housing schemes, race and class 
differences are interacting in an overlapping, unspoken ways that result in 
perplexing controversies like the poor door.  Assessing the propriety of the 
poor doors and income based distinctions in access to amenities in mixed-
income housing requires considering the overarching policy reasons for 
adopting the mixed-income principle in the first place.  The emphasis on 
income mixing suggests a perceived value from connection and access for 
people of different income brackets to be in the same places.  Indeed, the data, 
suggests that the trend in U.S. housing development is towards greater 
economic segregation.66  The literature also reveals that economic segregation 
is an even greater problem when viewed through the lens of race.67  Yet the 
story of class is intertwined with the story of race.  The black and poor in the 
United States are the most segregated group by far.68  In the context of the 
United States’ protracted history of racial segregation, the quest for racial 
integration undeniably undergirds inclusionary housing’s mixed income, 
racially neutral, class-based strategy.  Racial integration as a policy goal lingers 
in the background, undefined, undiscussed, and unfulfilled.  This unresolved 
tension is exacerbated by the U.S. Supreme Court having read racial 
integration out of constitutional jurisprudence.69  The Court only recently 
affirmed that avoiding racial isolation and achieving diversity constitute a 
compelling government interest, yet it still struggles to reconcile the efforts to 
address persistent racial disparities in ways considered acceptably race neutral 
or even colorblind.70  In addition, concerns about racial segregation are 
 
acquisition of material things.  But there might likewise be changes in the 
perception of one's race as one travels through different strata of class.   
 Audrey G. McFarlane, Operatively White?: Exploring the Significance of Race and Class 
Through the Paradox of Black Middle-Classness, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.,  163, 184–85 (2009). 
66. See generally RICHARD FLORIDA & CHARLOTTA MELLANDER, MARTIN PROSPERITY INST., 
SEGREGATED CITY: THE GEOGRAPHY OF ECONOMIC SEGREGATION IN AMERICA’S METROS, (2015) 
http://martinprosperity.org/media/Segregated%20City.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZQZ5-64BH]. 
67. See generally RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW 
OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017). 
68. See generally Massey & Tannen, supra note 24, at 1025. 
69. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (invalidating a school integration remedy that 
required crossing school district jurisdictional boundaries because it arose from defacto not 
dejure segregation); Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp, 429 U.S. 252 (1977) 
(upholding a town’s exclusion of an integrated housing development for failing to show 
intentional racial discrimination). 
70. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 797 (2007) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (rejecting integrative school assignment plan because use of racial categories was 
not sufficiently narrowly tailored); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) 
(holding that the Texas system of school finance which resulted in well-funded schools and 
impoverished schools did not violate Equal Protection).  But see Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. 
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considered old fashioned, out of date, and politically incendiary because the 
status of racial integration and diversity in contemporary American culture is 
being seriously questioned.71 
  Mixed-income housing as our integration strategy and the poor door 
controversy reveals the unaddressed tensions simmering beneath the surface 
of mixed-income housing policy.  The most significant tension is that the 
policy seeks to circumvent discrimination by managing it. 
II. MIXING AND THE CHALLENGES OF SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION 
A. Mixing as Utopian Social Ideal 
Mixed-income housing embodies idealized notions of social mixing, 
whose origins within a line of utopian thinking date back to the late 1800s.  
Mixing was integral to ideas about desirable community design—seen as 
egalitarian, providing ‘balance,’ and making common sense.72  This notion of 
balance was at once conservative and romantic—harkening back to notions 
of the rural village as a model of interaction but maintaining a sense of 
everyone having their designated social place.73  The famously successful 
Garden City movement, while adopting a limited form of social mixing, 
spread the idea of mixing as a normative goal.74  The communities were 
intended to contain “a cross-section of society” at the macro level, but 
communities were also segregated by class “on the micro-level.”75  The 
assumption was that the lower class would reap advantage from contact with 
 
Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (recognizing disparate impact as 
a basis of FHA liability but requiring proof of causation). 
71. Kenneth W. Mack, Law and Local Knowledge in the History of the Civil Rights Movement, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1018 (2019) (reviewing TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA 
AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2012)) (describing how “[l]aw, 
including Supreme Court decisions, often helped and hindered the participants in civil rights-
era controversies in unexpected ways . . . ”). 
72. See Sarah Glynn, Regeneration as a Trojan Horse, in WHERE THE OTHER HALF LIVES: 
LOWER INCOME HOUSING IN A NEOLIBERAL WORLD 77 (Sarah Glynn ed., 2009) (discussing 
the idea of tenure mix and mixed-income housing to as early as 1838 when a UK 
parliamentary Select Committee argued “seclusion from ‘the observation and influence 
of better educated neighbours’ in the dense London slums resulted in a ‘state of moral 
degradation.’”). 
73.  BOURNVILLE VILL. TR., THE BOURNVILLE VILAGE TRUST, 1900–1955, 19 (1956) (discussing 
an early utopian development, Bourneville near Birmingham U.K. in the 1890s aimed at 
“gathering together as mixed a community as possible applied to the character and 
interests as well as to the income and social class”).  See also Wendy Sarkissian, The Idea 
of Social Mix in Town Planning: An Historical Review, 13 URB. STUD. 231, 235 (1976).   
74. See EBENEZER HOWARD, GARDEN CITIES OF TOMORROW (1902). 
75. See Sarkissian, supra note 73, at 235. 
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higher classes, likely as a consequence of the functional need for a range of 
employment.76 
The most consistent, modern proponent of mixing was historian and 
sociologist Lewis Mumford.  His social philosophy opposed segregation in 
any form as being artificial, destructive of cultural unity, and detrimental to 
society.77  According to Mumford, the issue was a functional one: 
[T[he city, if it is to function effectively, cannot be a segregated 
environment: the city with the single class, with a single social 
stratum, with a single type of industrial activity, offers fewer 
possibilities for the higher forms of human achievement than a 
many-sided urban environment.78 
Notwithstanding Mumford’s views, with few exceptions, the approach 
to community design that was actually practiced during the twentieth century 
involved social separation along race and class lines, rather than mixing.  At 
the time, the reality of residential living patterns followed a norm of stringent 
racial segregation.79  Also, according to planner Wendy Sarkissian, “American 
housing and planning legislation since 1954 has . . . inefficiently[] emphasized 
social mix at the neighborhood level.”80  Such “[m]ix  distinctly favoured the 
middle class.”81  She further noted, however, “neither the degree of mix nor 
the means of achieving mix was spelled out very clearly.”82  Nevertheless, 
during the Cold War era, these general notions of social mixing and the 
socially balanced neighborhood as a planning goal allowed the United States 
 
76. See id. at 236.  Another Garden City proponent, Sennett opposed micro mixing—“residential 
segregation by class was essential,” he thought and “any greater degree of mix” would mean “a 
dead level of equality” and hence mediocrity.  Id. at 236.  Yet another Garden City contemporary, 
however, advocated residential mix for three reasons: (1) Aesthetics—exposure to beautiful 
buildings; (2) Social—"all classes may live in kindly neighborliness” and (3) Functional—“the 
factory worker and the brain worker in the same district . . . is . . . expressly desirable.”).  Id. 
77. Id. at 237. 
78. LEWIS MUMFORD, THE CULTURE OF CITIES 486 (1938).  
79. See Sarkissian, supra note 73, at 239. 
80. Id.  at 240.  Sarkissian argues that the Housing Act of 1954 (urban renewal), the New 
Communities Act of 1968, and efforts to adopt inclusionary zoning in Fairfax County in 
the early 1970s were all “attempts to increase opportunities for low-income and black 
families to live in neighborhoods which would otherwise have been racially or socially 
homogeneous.”  Id.  With regards to urban renewal, Sarkissian asserts that urban renewal 
was pro-mix—“on the assumption that mix contributed to community stability and 
would stem movement of the upper classes to the suburbs.”  Id. at 241.  “Public reaction 
to the effects of early urban renewal programmes (which featured ‘slum clearance’ and 
‘comprehensive redevelopment’) finally significantly changed the direction of thinking about 
social mix, and is responsible in part for the present re-evaluation of the concept.”  Id. at 241. 
81. Id.  
82. Id. 
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to present itself as having removed impediments to economic opportunity 
and “demonstrate that under its new welfare economy, the . . . [US] 
government [would] now be employed to secure a decent family life in 
neighborhoods which afford equal access to all, regardless of race, creed or 
color.”83 
On its face, aspiring to social mixing is fair and egalitarian in a plural 
society.  It seems sensible, if not important, that people be accustomed to 
people from all walks of life.  Yet, beneath the surface, social mixing presents 
some discomfiting realities, including that in the past, mixing happened based 
on the needs of the affluent, and the arrangements retained strict 
demarcations of status distinctions and social control.  There was a time when 
social mixing in living arrangements was more prevalent.  Yet, such mixing in 
living arrangements was based on necessity and the reciprocal needs of the 
wealthy and those who served them.  In the mixed arrangements of the 
seventeenth century, for example, before the advent of elevators, the poor, in 
some European cities lived at the top of multistory apartments with the 
wealthier living in ground floor apartments.84  Because the lower classes often 
provided services to the wealthy, having them close by was essential.  
Similarly, until the early twentieth century in the United States, the servant 
and artisan classes lived in close proximity to the wealthy, making a form of 
mixing the default rather than the exception.  Housing in New Orleans and 
Washington DC for the wealthy and white, for example, was accompanied by 
a form of mixed housing scheme—lesser alley dwellings where the poorer, 
often black, servants lived, again, to service the needs of the wealthy.85  With 
improvements in technology and transportation, the need for proximity steadily 
decreased while a desire for social status differentiation increased. 
B. Mixing and Race: Segregation as a Quest for Social Dominance 
The desire for social status differentiation in the United States has 
manifested itself through a pursuit by white people of social separation via 
racial residential segregation.  Mixed-income housing policy only makes 
sense by taking this context into account.  Racial residential segregation has 
been deliberately and persistently constructed and fiercely maintained by 
 
83. Id. at 239. 
84. Id. 
85. SABIYHA PRINCE, AFRICAN AMERICANS AND GENTRIFICATION IN WASHINGTON, D.C.: RACE, 
CLASS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE NATION’S CAPITAL 43 (2014). 
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public and private actors.86  The persistence of the pursuit of residential 
segregation is important to consider because we only vaguely understand 
segregation as a pursuit of geographical differentiation and hierarchy; i.e. a 
quest for social dominance. 
Social dominance theory “attributes systemic racial inequality to 
purposeful efforts by dominant classes to preserve their privileged status.”87  
Under this theory, society organizes itself into groups, some of which are 
dominant while others are subordinate.88  The dominant groups are advantaged 
in status and access to resources, justifying such advantages through 
“legitimizing myths.”89  The myths “can appear as racist or as race-neutral and still 
accomplish the same goal of social domination.”90  Whites, as part of the 
dominant group in the United States endorse and legitimize race-neutral 
policies that disparately impact people of color to “preserve their dominant 
racial status.”91  For example, inequalities in the ways criminal laws are 
conceived, and enforced either selectively or harshly are  a persistent 
reflection and effective method of social dominance.92  Race has historically 
been connected to which activities were defined as crimes and resulted in 
today’s hierarchy of black subjugation and white supremacy where those with 
a criminal record are locked into economic and social exile.93  Racial 
segregation in housing reflects decisions made to legitimize exclusionary 
housing choices and patterns that result in racialized social dominance.  The 
legitimizing myth in terms of race, geography and housing is that the poverty 
of the inner cities and the racialized white wealth of the suburbs are due to 
individual merit which some groups possess and others do not.  Similarly, 
gentrification is considered inevitable and unstoppable because the dominant 
 
86. See, e.g., CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS: A STUDY OF PREJUDICE IN HOUSING 
(1955); DAVID M. P. FREUND, COLORED PROPERTY: STATE POLICY AND WHITE RACIAL 
POLITICS IN SUBURBAN AMERICA (2007); ROTHSTEIN, supra note 67. 
87. Darren L. Hutchinson, “Continually Reminded of Their Inferior Position”: Social 
Dominance, Implicit Bias, Criminality, and Race, 46 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 23, 53 (2015).  
See also Erika K. Wilson, Why Diversity Fails: Social Dominance Theory and the 
Entrenchment of Racial Inequality, 26 NAT. BLACK. L.J. 129, 147–50 (2017). 
88. JIM SIDANIUS & FELICIA PRATTO, SOCIAL DOMINANCE: AN INTERGROUP THEORY OF SOCIAL 
HIERARCHY AND OPPRESSION 31 (1999); see also Hutchinson, supra note 87, at 32.  
89. SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 88, at 31–32, 45–48.  
90. Hutchinson, supra note 87, at 47.  See also SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 88, at 171–75.   
91. Hutchinson, supra note 87, at 48.  See also SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 88, at 45; Reva 
B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes of the Law: How “Color Blindness” Discourse Disrupts 
and Rationalizes Social Stratification, 88 CAL. L. REV. 77, 95 (2000). 
92. See Hutchinson, supra note 87, at 32–33, 84. See also SIDANIUS & PRATTO, supra note 88, 
at 202, 205–06.  
93. See Hutchinson, supra note 87, at 74–85. 
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group have selected formerly reviled places as desirable.  In terms of particular 
locations and places, these choices, protected by law, naturalize and mask the 
pursuit of and a need for social dominance that once one looks closely is 
apparent as the heart of racial residential segregation. 
The history of racial residential segregation constructed during the 20th 
century can clearly be seen as being in pursuit of social domination.  Arising 
in response to newfound Black mobility at the end of legal slavery and the 
demise of Reconstruction,94 Whites engaged in a succession of efforts to 
contain, control, and isolate Blacks.95  In search of improving their economic 
circumstances and safety from the regimes of terror in former slave states, 
Blacks migrated both locally and nationally in search of work and freedom 
from the violence and feudal fetters of the Jim Crow south.96  Whites perceived 
this mobility as a problem, or even an upheaval.  Each succeeding decade in 
the 20th century witnessed the adoption of new and improved tools, both legal 
and extralegal, public and private.  These were accompanied by legitimizing 
myths that justified controlling where Blacks, and to ensure Whites lived apart 
from them.  These tools of residential separation involved a series of trial and 
error efforts that cumulatively implemented a desire by Whites to control 
Black movement and live apart from Blacks, Asians, Jews, Mexicans, 
immigrants or anyone stigmatized as being undesirable.97  This separation is 
noteworthy because postslavery, Blacks and Whites often lived in much less 
separated residential patterns than today with some Blacks and some Whites 
living intermixed or in scattered micropockets of racial groupings, still 
segregated but less so than today.98  And simultaneously even during those 
 
94. This effort was of course in tandem with efforts to promote racial segregation in all other 
aspects of American life, employment, education, public accommodations.  See, e.g., 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (affirming strict racial separation and exclusion 
in public accommodations), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 
(1954); Uston v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370, 373–74 (N.J. 1982) (attributing 
the concept of the proprietor’s “absolute right of exclusion” at places otherwise held open 
to the public to the end of slavery). 
95. Charles Abrams lamented: “The suburbs and the quest for status are shaping the 
American personality of the future as the frontier once shaped the American personality 
of the past . . . .  American neighborhoods have turned into a breeding ground of bias, 
fear and discrimination.”  ABRAMS, supra note 86, at 140, 149.  The fear was one of 
inundation.  For example, in interracial public and cooperative housing, quotas for the 
number of Negroes appears to have been considered desirable.  Id. at 311–12, 316. 
96. See generally ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS: THE EPIC STORY OF 
AMERICA’S GREAT MIGRATION (2010). 
97. See text accompanying notes 96–112. 
98. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE 
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 20 (1993).  See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 67, at 22, 27 
(describing existing racially mixed neighborhoods).  New, finer-grained studies reveal 
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relatively more integrated days, because of the separation that did exist, Blacks 
were more easily economically exploited, as their options for living spaces 
were kept artificially limited by segregation.  They paid relatively high rents 
for poor living accommodations.99 
Though the racial residential segregation that we live with today seems 
natural to some and inevitable to many, the literature makes it quite clear that 
it did not happen by accident.  Instead, the landscape we navigate daily was 
deliberately constructed by multiple individual, institutional, and 
governmental decisions and policies over the past 100 years.  The residential 
segregation that was constructed during the twentieth century continues to 
this day and has resulted in a pattern of racial residential segregation across 
the United States. 
Social domination theory posits that efforts to maintain social 
dominance, in this case segregation, take place simultaneously through 
individual, institutional, and societal means.  Segregation was created and 
maintained through a variety of means that reflect an ever-shifting interplay 
of private sentiments and public practices.100  It was a vast self-reinforcing 
experiment of sorts—with the invalidation of one technique, another 
technique replaced it.  Sometimes there was government regulation, state 
action, unofficial practices, or failure to regulate or provide redress.  For 
example, the Supreme Court’s invalidation of racial zoning in 1917 led to a 
desperate search for other mechanisms to contain black mobility and fulfill 
the continued pervasive desire for separation.101  Private land use agreements 
 
racial mixing in neighborhoods as segregation doubled nationally from 1880 to 1940.  
Trevon D. Logan & John M. Parman, The National Rise in Residential Segregation, 77 J. 
ECON. HIST. 127, 129 (2017). 
99. See generally DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-
ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2008).  But 
see generally N.D.B. CONNOLLY, A WORLD MORE CONCRETE: REAL ESTATE AND THE 
REMAKING OF JIM CROW SOUTH FLORIDA (2014). 
100. See, e.g., Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, The Fair Housing Choice Myth, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 967, 
967 (2012) (concluding that the Fair Housing Act’s nondiscrimination provisions cannot 
combat white housing preferences for segregation). 
101. See Garrett Power, Apartheid Baltimore Style: The Residential Segregation Ordinances of 
1910–1913, 42 MD. L. REV. 289, 314–15 (1983) (discussing Baltimore’s decision to closely 
follow the Chicago Plan for racial segregation: “The plan was ‘to forc[e] out the blacks 
already residing in [white] neighborhoods and [to ensure] that no others entered.’”); 
Garrett Power, Meade v. Dennistone: The NAACP's Test Case to " . . . Sue Jim Crow Out 
of Maryland with the Fourteenth Amendment", 63 MD. L. REV. 773, 792 (2004) (“The 
Committee on Segregation undertook to encourage neighbors, government officials, and 
real estate agents to use restrictive covenants, peer pressure, harassment, and suasion to 
promote de facto segregation.”). 
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and racially restrictive covenants became the next technique of choice.102  
While enforcement of such covenants was proscribed in 1948,103 private 
decisions to racially discriminate went unchecked until the 1968 Fair Housing 
Act.104  At the same time, federal practices enshrined racial segregation in 
suburban living patterns through federal financing guarantees.  Redlining based 
lending risk assessments on negative racial perceptions assuming black 
occupancy in a neighborhood meant it was in decline or of low value.105  
Racially homogeneous white neighborhoods were deemed a sure bet for stable 
lending.  Regardless of income, mortgage loans were overwhelmingly 
unavailable to Blacks.106  Segregation was also enforced by violence, which was 
especially prevelant when black families tried to move into white 
neighborhoods.107  Tacit agreements among owners and realtors also allowed 
the ghetto to easily capture Blacks as they sought to move.108   
Also, the federal government consistently conditioned building projects 
on maintaining strict racial separation or exclusion of Blacks  under the 
rationale that it was adopting the prevailing practices but often it was 
introducing racially segregatory practices.109  Similarly, eminent domain and 
 
102. See Power, Meade v. Dennistone, supra note 101, at 792. (detailing the collaboration 
between the city agencies, real estate professionals and white homeowners associations 
to racially segregate black homeowners). 
103. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
104. For example, the infamous Levittown development was racially restricted based on what 
was considered to be a market imperative of prevailing hostility to Black neighbors.  See 
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 67, at 266.  (“‘As a Jew, I have no room in my mind or heart for 
racial prejudice,” [Levittown builder William Levitt] said.  “But I have come to know that 
if we sell one house to a Negro family, then 90 or 95 percent of our white customers will 
not buy into the community.  This is their attitude, not ours.  As a company, our position 
is simply this: We can solve a housing problem, or we can try to solve a racial problem, 
but we cannot combine the two.’”).  
105. See FREUND, supra note 86, at 113–14; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 67, at 64–82, 86; JACKSON 
infra note 195, 199–200 (2017).  
106. See generally BERYL SATTER, FAMILY PROPERTIES: RACE, REAL ESTATE, AND THE 
EXPLOITATION OF BLACK URBAN AMERICA (2009). 
107. In the Midwest and the South, for example, sundown towns rigidly enforced a tacit threat 
that black people had to be out of town by sundown.  JAMES W. LOEWEN, SUNDOWN 
TOWNS: A HIDDEN DIMENSION OF AMERICAN RACISM, 90–115 (2005) (describing the 
variety of methods for excluding black people from towns across America through 
violence, ordinance or informal law enforcement actions.  The term “sundown” refers to 
the understanding that black people had to conclude their business in a town and get out 
by the end of the day). 
108. See ANTERO PIETILA, NOT IN MY NEIGHBORHOOD: HOW BIGOTRY SHAPED A GREAT 
AMERICAN CITY 56–60 (2010). 
109. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 67, at 21.  During the Depression era, federal housing projects 
followed “a ‘neighborhood composition rule’: federal housing projects should reflect the 
previous racial composition of their neighborhoods.  Projects in white areas could house 
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redevelopment disproportionately targeted black neighborhoods.110  And 
through it all, municipal regulatory power was exercised via zoning—styled as 
neutral, implemented according to an exclusionary world view, but ultimately a 
pillar of residential racial segregation.  Zoning ordinances emerged as a 
revolutionary modern tool of regulation that applied race and class reasoning 
and aspirations to a still nascent suburban ideal to restrict land use by building 
type.  Such ordinances assumed an inherent incompatibility between the 
single-family home and the multifamily building.  When the Supreme Court 
ratified zoning in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,111 it enshrined 
economic segregation and exclusion as a constitutional, if not sensible, 
exercise of the police power.  One’s housing type and size were understood as 
a function of buying power and, tacitly, of economic station.  Exclusionary 
zoning thus became a central tool in the localist toolkit for hoarding resources 
for the members of relatively affluent local government units.112 
 
only white tenants, those in African American areas could house only African American 
tenants, and only projects in already-integrated neighborhoods could house both whites 
and blacks.”  Id.  
110. See Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 428 (D. Md. 
2005) (describing an example of segregatory practices in relation to Baltimore’s public 
housing); ROTHSTEIN, supra note 67, at 32, 191–92 (use of redevelopment to demolish 
black neighborhoods usually forcing black residents into other segregated 
neighborhoods.).  See also James A. Kushner, Apartheid in America: An Historical and 
Legal Analysis of Contemporary Racial Residential Segregation in the United States, 22 
HOW. L.J. 547, 588–90 (1979) (noting that the Great Society programs with geographic 
emphasis and geographic eligibility requirements, like Model Cities and Community 
Action Programs, generally perceived as benign or beneficial, worsened segregation and 
movement to the suburbs); Colin Marshall, Pruitt-Igoe: The Troubled High-Rise That 
Came to Define Urban America, GUARDIAN (Apr. 22, 2015, 7:52 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/apr/22/pruitt-igoe-high-rise-urban-america-
history-cities [https://perma.cc/D6XL-AEYQ] (infamous public housing project 
demolished in the 1970s that has come to symbolize the failures of public housing 
divorced from place, economic feasibility and the needs of its residents). 
111. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
112.  See RICHARD REEVES, DREAM HOARDERS: HOW THE AMERICAN UPPER MIDDLE CLASS IS 
LEAVING EVERYONE ELSE IN THE DUST, WHY THAT IS A PROBLEM, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT 
IT (2017); Steve Inskeep, Top 20% of Americans ‘Hoard the American Dream’, NPR: 
MORNING EDITION (May 31, 2017, 5:03 AM), http://www.npr.org/2017/05/31 
/530843665/top-20-percent-of-americans-hoard-the-american-dream 
[https://perma.cc/QC3U-9KRB] (“Reeves argues that the top 20 percent of 
Americans . . . dominate the best schools, live in the best-located homes and pass on the 
best futures to their kids. . . .  ‘[W]e protect our neighborhoods, we hoard housing 
wealth, we also monopolize selective higher education and then we hand out internships 
and work opportunities on the basis of the social network—people we know in the 
neighborhood or meet on the tennis courts.  As so to that extent we are kind of hoarding 
those things that should be more widely available.’”). 
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For much of the twentieth century, the racially-disparate negative effects 
of zoning were rarely acknowledged, and were legitimated as natural and 
inevitable.113  One consequence has been that zoning has enshrined a 
stigmatization of lower cost multifamily housing, in particular rental 
apartments—it allows owners of relatively higher priced single family housing 
to exclude multifamily housing structures from zones designated single 
family.114  For over 90 years, zoning as a tool of community design has allowed 
choices that assumed the most desirable way to live was cloistered from 
commerce, lower cost housing, strangers, and foot traffic.115  An overlooked 
consequence of the ubiquity of this assumption is that but for zoning, an 
individual homeowner’s or neighborhood’s  ability to exclude low cost 
housing would not exist.116  This history of deliberate, consistent, and 
 
113. See Ambler Realty Co. v. Vill. of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 313 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev’d, 272 U.S. 
365 (1926) (“[N]o gift of second sight is required to foresee that if [racial zoning] had 
been sustained [in Buchanan], its provisions would have spread from city to city 
throughout the length and breadth of the land.  And it is equally apparent that the next 
step in the exercise of this police power would be to apply similar restrictions for the 
purpose of segregating in like manner various groups of newly arrived immigrants.  The 
blighting of property values and the congesting of population, whenever the colored 
races or certain foreign races invade a residential section, are so well known as to be 
within judicial cognizance.”).  
114. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394–95 (“[I]n . . . [single family or 
detached houses] sections very often the apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed 
in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the 
residential character of the district . . . .their height and bulk [interfering]with the free 
circulation of air and monopolizing the rays of the sun . . . and bringing, as their 
necessary accompaniments, the disturbing noises incident to increased traffic and 
business . . . detracting from their safety and depriving children of the privilege of quiet 
and open spaces for play, . . . until, finally, the residential character of the neighborhood 
and its desirability as a place of detached residences are utterly destroyed.  Under these 
circumstances, apartment houses . . . come very near to being nuisances.”).  
115. Though studies seldom demonstrate a negative impact on housing prices from the 
construction of well-managed and appropriately scaled apartments, the conventional 
wisdom that multifamily housing hurts property values is accepted unquestioningly as 
fact.  See Mai Thi Nguyen et al., Opposition to Affordable Housing in the USA: Debate 
Framing and the Responses of Local Actors, 30 HOUSING THEORY & SOC’Y 107, 111 (2013) 
(discussing the stigmatization of affordable housing as tied to race and attributed to, 
among other things, fears of declines in property values); J. Rosie Tighe, Public Opinion 
and Affordable Housing: A Review of the Literature, 25 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 3, 9–10 (2010) 
(noting the numerous efforts to study assumed negative effects of affordable housing on 
property values and finding little evidence of such effect from well-managed 
developments).  
116. GUY STUART, DISCRIMINATING RISK, THE U.S. MORTGAGE LENDING INDUSTRY IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 37 (2003) (observing that, absent zoning, high land values are inadequate 
for excluding lower-income residents from a neighborhood because housing can be made 
affordable by owners building and renting out apartments).  The effect of lower cost housing 
located near higher cost housing could be nearly eliminated because no neighborhood 
1168 66 UCLA L. REV. 1140 (2019) 
institutional racial segregation has led to effects that are devastating in two 
overlooked respects—segregation has 1) shaped the lack of affordable housing 
in the United States and 2) been exacerbated by unstable, market-based 
approaches to the provision of lower-income housing.117  
C. Mixing and Class: The Opposition to Low-Income Housing 
The notion that poor people bring something undesirable to a 
neighborhood has been widespread and persistent in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries.  This belief manifests in persistent opposition to the 
building of low-income housing in single family residential home 
neighborhoods.118  This opposition is largely seen as a rational response to the 
investment in one’s home resulting in an attendant investment in racialized 
property values enhanced by race and class exclusion.119  Social domination 
theory is helpful for understanding this class opposition as a pursuit of status 
and dominance, as well as the reciprocal relationship between dominant and 
subordinate status.  Thus, the flip side of the resulting black spatial isolation 
is status protection.  White residential homogeneity has benefitted Whites 
financially and psychically by providing a highly valued form of culturally 
transmitted capital.  Not only does segregation relate to such status, but it 
allows Whites to feel safe from fear of Blacks.  The fear is rationally 
irrational—the safety provided by segregation is so highly valued that it is 
reflected in the prices that buyers are willing to pay for neighborhoods that 
 
would be immune and builders who might find it financially attractive to build such 
housing could do so.  Low cost housing would theoretically be dispersed in diverse places.  
The ability to run would not exist and thus the need to accept it would be increased.  
117. See generally JASON HACKWORTH, THE NEOLIBERAL CITY: GOVERNANCE, IDEOLOGY, AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN URBANISM 48–60 (2006) (describing the influence of 
neoliberalism in the move towards privatization in the provision of public housing as 
exemplified by the HOPE VI program). 
118. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET AL., CLIMBING MOUNT LAUREL: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND SOCIAL MOBILITY IN AN AMERICAN SUBURB 44–49 (2013) 
(providing an example of the typical political opposition to an affordable housing 
development in Mount Laurel, New Jersey); JEANNINE BELL, HATE THY NEIGHBOR: MOVE-
IN VIOLENCE AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN HOUSING 158–
59 (2012) (describing the opposition to affordable housing in Chicago in the context of 
Gautreaux litigation settlement); CHARLES M. LAMB, HOUSING SEGREGATION IN SUBURBAN 
AMERICA SINCE 1960: PRESIDENTIAL AND JUDICIAL POLITICS 235–36 (2005) (noting the 
reality of opposition to low-income family housing in Nassau County, Long Island as 
perceived as being occupied by African Americans).  
119. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001). 
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are homogeneous.120  It has also enabled the white hoarding of segregation’s 
benefits, with resources withdrawn in various ways from black areas.121  As 
discussed above, generic rules of zoning allow those resources in terms of 
lower taxes from higher property values and with greater resources for 
services like schools, to be retained for current and future generations.122  As 
a result of the successful opposition to low-income housing, the segregated 
metropolitan landscape is comprised of a spatial and societal dynamic of stigma, 
shame, valorization, and self-satisfaction.  The stark contrast in neighborhood 
circumstances also provides an unacknowledged benefit—the pleasure of the 
contrast, a reciprocal relationship between disinvestment and valorization.  
The worse one area is, the more valuable other areas will be.  This benefit is 
racialized—it is available to Whites even if they are lower income.123   
The cost is a belief that this engineered situation is natural, and that to 
reverse it requires social engineering.  This fuels a racialized withdrawal from the 
provision of public goods, or seeing the need for them, because they are 
 
120. MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH, WHITE WEALTH: A NEW 
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 150 (2d ed., 2006) (“In general, homes of similar 
design, size, and appearance cost more in white communities than in black or integrated 
communities.  Their value also rises more quickly and steeply in white communities.  In 
theory, then, whites pay a premium to live in homogeneous neighborhoods, but their 
property appreciates at an enhanced rate.”).  See also LEEANN LANDS, THE CULTURE OF 
PROPERTY: RACE, CLASS, AND HOUSING LANDSCAPES IN ATLANTA, 1880–1950 93 (2009) 
(noting an early opponent to racial integration argued “[t]here is no problem so grave, 
nor one so fraught with so much danger to property values as the gradual influx of the 
negro into blocks or squares where none but whites reside”); WILKERSON, supra note 96, 
at 376 (“It was an article of faith among many people in Chicago and other big cities that 
the arrival of colored people in an all-white neighborhood automatically lowered 
property values.”). 
121. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL: THE AMERICAN STRATIFICATION 
SYSTEM 19 (2007) (“If out-group members are spatially segregated from in-group 
members, then the latter are put in a good position to use their social power to create 
institutions and practices that channel resources away from the places where out-group 
members live . . . .  Spatial segregation renders stratification easy, convenient, and 
efficient because simply by investing or disinvesting in a place, one can invest or disinvest 
in a whole set of people.”). 
122. See REEVES, supra note 112, at 104–05 (describing the manifestation of exclusionary 
zoning today). 
123. While the white lower-income person generally does not reside in neighborhoods of 
concentrated poverty and instead resides in economically integrated neighborhoods, 
overall income inequality is increasing economic segregation as the advantaged segregate 
themselves.  See generally FLORIDA & MELLANDER, supra note 66 (“The wealthy are more 
segregated than the poor—indeed they are the most segregated of all, and by a considerable 
margin . . . . About half of all black families have lived in the poorest American 
neighborhoods over the last two generations, compared to just 7 percent of white 
families.”). 
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perceived to be benefiting an undeserving, illegitimate other—Blacks.124  The 
opposition to low-income housing has been, and is still, a significant 
impediment to racial integration and the building of affordable housing 
outside of the inner cities.  It is the reason why racial segregation continues to 
be a battleground fifty years after the passage of the Fair Housing Act.125 
1. Federal Withdrawal From Support for Affordable Housing  
Has Led to Market-Based Approaches 
The negative attitude towards public or social housing in the United 
States has been shaped by a sense of failure of surrounding public housing 
developments accompanied by a longstanding ideologically driven belief that 
somehow the private market can do a better job than the government.126  
Public housing began almost as an aberration following the Great Depression 
to address the housing needs of a temporarily submerged middle class and 
then became a program of last resort, housing for the poorest of the poor.127  
With the growing lack of support for social housing, the federal government 
has steadily withdrawn direct financial support for construction and subsidies 
and tended towards relying on private markets and actors—the most dramatic 
illustrations of this approach are the Section 8 housing voucher program and the 
Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) programs.128  Accompanying this 
development has been the rise of the mixed-income principle, whose 
 
124. While the homogeneity has benefited white residents financially, it has arguably deprived 
white people living in homogenously white areas of access to and ability to cope with 
difference.  Martha Minow, After Brown: What Would Martin Luther King Say?, 12 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 599, 640 (2008) (“A 2006 review of 500 prior studies, involving 
more than 250,000 participants, found that greater levels of intergroup contact among 
children, adolescents, and adults are associated with lower levels of intergroup 
prejudice.”).  But J. Eric Oliver notes that the higher the minority population at the 
metropolitan level, the higher levels of racial prejudice.  J. ERIC OLIVER, THE PARADOXES 
OF INTEGRATION: RACE, NEIGHBORHOOD, AND CIVIC LIFE IN MULTIETHNIC AMERICA 8 
(2010). 
125. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. 
Ct. 2507 (2015) (holding that disparate-impact liability was available under the Fair 
Housing Act); Cty. of Westchester v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 116 F. Supp. 3d 
251, 261 (S.D.N.Y 2015), aff’d, 802 F.3d 413 (2d Cir. 2015) (dismissing County’s 
challenge to earlier ruling that False Claims Act had been violated when County falsely 
certified it had analyzed race-based impediments to fair housing).   
126. See LAWRENCE J. VALE, PURGING THE POOREST: PUBLIC HOUSING AND THE DESIGN POLITICS 
OF TWICE-CLEARED COMMUNITIES (2013). 
127. See Jason Hackworth, Destroyed by Hope: Public Housing, Neoliberalism and Progressive 
Housing Activism in the US, in WHERE THE OTHER HALF LIVES: LOWER INCOME HOUSING 
IN A NEOLIBERAL WORLD 236 (Sarah Glynn ed., 2009). 
128. See id. at 241. 
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popularity has grown steadily as a way to avoid the past failures of public 
housing and hopefully ensure healthy sustainable integrated developments.129  
The extensive public housing redevelopment program, HOPE VI, was the first 
widespread effort to adopt the mixed-income and mixed-tenure principle.130  
The program was highly controversial because it tore down existing public 
housing to construct mixed-income, mixed-tenure replacement housing 
developments that never contained sufficient units to house all of the original 
residents.131  Displaced residents were often given Section 8 vouchers and were 
forced to resettle in surrounding high-poverty, segregated neighborhoods.132  
This history is crucial for understanding how mixed-income housing has 
become so popular.  The Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) began to endorse mixed-income housing as the desirable way to build 
social housing and foster integration.133  While not widely understood as a 
racial integration strategy, the tacit assumption has been that indirectly, 
economic integration would achieve all of the same things that a racial 
integration strategy would.  Since Blacks are overrepresented in low-income 
groups, the unspoken assumption is that Blacks will likely be included in the 
target beneficiary group in many metropolitan areas.  This is beneficial since, 
as this paper argues, economic integration is more socially and politically 
 
129. See Glynn, supra note 72, at 78 (“[T]he push for income mix today has coincided with a 
retreat towards past levels of inequality as governments abandon the idea that equality is 
possible, or even desirable.  Income mix has become a substitute for income 
equality. . . .  The current incarnation of the idea of income mix is based around the 
argument for area effects—that is, that it is worse to be poor in a poor area than poor in 
an area of mixed prosperity.  This is an idea that developed in the United States and has 
become generally accepted, acquiring the status of a common-sense truth.  However, it 
was based more on intuition than evidence.”).  
130. See Richard D. Baron, The Evolution of Hope VI as a Development Program, in FROM 
DESPAIR TO HOPE: HOPE VI AND THE NEW PROMISE OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN AMERICA’S 
CITIES 31, 31–33 (Henry G. Cisneros & Lora Engdahl eds., 2009); Henry G. Cisneros, A 
New Moment for People and Cities, in FROM DESPAIR TO HOPE: HOPE VI AND THE NEW 
PROMISE OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN AMERICA’S CITIES, supra, at 9–12; Bruce Katz, The Origins 
of Hope VI, in FROM DESPAIR TO HOPE: HOPE VI AND THE NEW PROMISE OF PUBLIC 
HOUSING IN AMERICA’S CITIES, supra, at 21. 
131. See generally WHERE ARE POOR PEOPLE TO LIVE?: TRANSFORMING PUBLIC HOUSING 
COMMUNITIES (Larry Bennett, Janet L. Smith, & Patricia A. Wright eds., 2006) (describing 
Chicago and other cities efforts to build mixed-income housing through the HOPE VI 
program). 
132. See Thompson v. Dep’t Hous. & Urban Dev., 404 F.3d 821 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding HUD 
failed to affirmatively further fair housing when it allowed public housing authorities to 
follow historic intentionally racial discriminatory patterns of public housing siting). 
133. See Bruce Katz, supra note 130, at 27. 
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palatable since racial hostility is still a feature of the American landscape.134  
Yet whether mixed-income housing represents an advancement or 
retrenchment is still an unanswered question.  As Edward Goetz observes:  
“We find ourselves now at the end of the era of public housing, as 
those same facilities, now aged, neglected, and sometimes severely 
distressed, are taken down and replaced by another new planners’ 
utopia, the mixed-income, New Urbanist community.  This 
circularity is notable in itself . . . .”135 
The downside of the economic integration approach is the extent to 
which market considerations fail to meet the needs of those in most need of 
housing support.  As the following discussion will demonstrate, the market 
does not favor low-income people. Racial stigma and hostility over status 
threat are ever present.  Providing a public good like mixed-income housing 
through private means requires program administration that maximizes 
private market value with the minimum of public subsidy.  In the housing 
context, this reality has been exacerbated by the steadily declining financial 
support for subsidized rental housing. 
D. Mixing and the Consequences of Segregation 
The legacy of twentieth century segregation and present-day segregative 
behaviors is widespread white-black spatial isolation and social separation.  While 
mixing is the current social goal, our metropolitan regions are divided into 
dual housing markets that result in concentrations of black disadvantage and 
white advantage.  Black people were excluded from the initial wave of 
suburbanization and were overwhelmingly cut off from access to asset 
building through house value appreciation.  They were instead relegated to 
crowded, expensive areas with depressed markets.136  The consequence and 
challenge for mixing is that wherever Blacks are they are concentrated in 
 
134. See Seicshnaydre, supra note 100, at 1015 (“Inclusionary zoning policies are not silver 
bullets for inclusion in that urban poor households do not always benefit from these policies.”); 
see generally Drew Volmert et. al., Mixing It Up: Reframing Neighborhood Socioeconomic 
Diversity 44–48 (2016) (for a helpful exposition of the need for economic integration while 
secondarily acknowledging racial integration and Fair Housing as a necessary component), 
http://www.frameworksinstitute.org/pubs/mm/mixingitup/Knight_MessageMemo_Final_2
016.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5P7-EB4R]. 
135. Edward G. Goetz, Book Review: Purging the Poorest: Public Housing and the Design 
Politics of Twice-Cleared Communities, 44 CONTEMP. SOC., 128 (2015) (reviewing VALE, 
supra note 126) https://journals.sagepub.com /doi/full/10.1177/0094306114562201ddd 
[https://perma.cc/5JYW-CCHD]. 
136. See generally FREUND, supra note 86. 
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certain identifiable areas of town.137  This phenomenon of segregation can be 
measured by a “dissimilarity index,” which indexes metropolitan areas based 
on the percentage of Whites that would have to move to achieve statistical 
integration.138  Thus an index of 65 means 65 percent of Blacks would have to 
move to achieve eliminate segregation.  All of the dissimilarity indices show 
increasing rates of black-white segregation through the twentieth century.139  
As Massey and Denton found, “[b]efore 1940, no racial or ethnic 
group . . . had ever experienced an isolation index above 60 percent,” but 
between 1940 and 1970 Blacks and Whites occupied wholly distinct 
neighborhoods.140  As discussed above, this was a dramatic departure from 
nineteenth century residential housing patterns “where neighborhoods were 
racially integrated and the social worlds of blacks and whites overlapped.”141  
The depressive impact on wealth accumulation and intergenerational wealth 
transmission serves as a profound intergenerational transmission of inequality.142 
 
137. The scientific measures fail to capture the lived experiences of racial separation and 
homogeneity.  That lived experience has to take into account both the pain and pleasure 
of the resulting racial segregation.  On the one hand, racial segregation has provided a 
certain predictability to our metropolitan areas.  It denotes for many places to be avoided 
and places to desire.  For example, academics and journalists have documented that the 
vast majority of MLK Blvds in the United States ran through areas with Black residents.  
See Tanvi Misra, The Remaking of Martin Luther King Streets, CITYLAB (Nov. 23, 2015), 
https://www.citylab.com/solutions/2015/11/the-remaking-of-martin-luther-king-
streets/415449 [https://perma.cc/X5WN-6B4T].   
138. See generally RICHARD H. SANDER, YANA A. KUCHEVA & JONATHAN M. ZASLOFF, MOVING 
TOWARD INTEGRATION: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF FAIR HOUSING passim (2018) 
(describing changes in the dissimilarity index over time as part of a comprehensive 
review of the policies giving rise to segregation and arguments for steps to take to 
promote integration). 
139. See generally MARK FOSSETT, NEW METHODS FOR MEASURING AND ANALYZING 
SEGREGATION (2017).  The persistent extreme segregation for black people in high 
poverty black neighborhoods that existed in the 1960s or 1970s are the same high poverty 
neighborhoods that exist today.  But see Alan Berube, Beyond Baltimore: Thoughts on 
Place, Race, and Opportunity, BROOKINGS (Sept. 29, 2015), 
https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/beyond-baltimore-thoughts-on-place-race-
and-opportunity [https://perma.cc /X5WN-6B4T] (noting that Baltimore has below 
average concentration of poverty); Keith Aoki, Direct Democracy, Racial Group Agency, 
Local Government Law, and Residential Racial Segregation: Some Reflections on Radical 
and Plural Democracy, 33 CAL. W. L. REV. 185, 195 (1997); (“[G]iven the same economic 
ability, Asians preferred to live in Asian and Anglo neighborhoods, while avoiding 
African-American communities.”). 
140. Douglas S. Massey, Origins of Economic Disparities: The Historical Role of Housing 
Segregation, in SEGREGATION: THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA 39, 66, 75 (James H. Carr 
& Nandinee K. Kutty eds., 2008). 
141. Id. at 75. 
142. See, e.g., MELVIN OLIVER & THOMAS SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW 
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 130–38, 148–68 (2d ed. 2006). 
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Racial segregation is still, however, perceived to be merely the natural 
separation of the races with the causes of that separation poorly understood.143  
The first way that segregation should be understood is as not merely 
separation, but as a disinvestment by the majority society.  That disinvestment 
happens on two levels.  First, disinvestment means that those with resources 
leave or avoid neighborhoods that are primarily Black or such neighborhoods 
become so after White flight.  Second, the neighborhoods are commercially 
abandoned—national retail and commercial enterprises bypass these 
communities, leading to food deserts, and a lack of banking and retail options.  
The consequence of both is that the housing markets suffer—to the extent there is 
homeownership, there will be lower property values for comparable housing.144 
Second, segregation should be understood as causing a concentration of 
impoverished Black people in racially segregated neighborhoods.  This 
phenomenon is seen as one of personal choice, cultural behaviors, and lack of 
striving—a bad place is widely believed to reflect bad people.  Yet, sociologists 
have proven that racial segregation causes concentrations of poverty.145  First, 
the trend towards racial segregation coincided with deindustrialization and 
the loss of manufacturing industries.  The resulting unemployment 
concentrates the people most affected into inner city communities.  As noted 
by William Julius Wilson, the poverty numbers and stigma are a geographical 
manifestation of these economic trends.146  For lower-income Blacks, these 
neighborhoods are characterized by low property values, high dilapidation, 
commercial underinvestment, criminogenic living experiences, and 
paradoxically high public investments focused on policing, incarceration, and 
 
143. See Volmert et. al., supra note 134, at 4.   
144. See Rafael Mota, The Power of an Illusion: How the Racial Wealth Gap was Created, 
YouTube (Sep. 13. 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QHo8AKNfB68 
(discussing the property values of his childhood home as compared to identical 
structures in white suburban neighborhoods). 
145. See generally MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 98, at 115–47 (segregation leads to 
geographical stratification of affluence and poverty that tracks race); GARY ORFIELD, 
CHUNGMEI LEE, WHY SEGREGATION MATTERS: POVERTY AND EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY 
(2005) (segregation creates high poverty schools); MARY PATTILLO, BLACK PICKET FENCES: 
PRIVILEGE AND PERIL AMONG THE BLACK MIDDLE CLASS, (2d ed. 2013); JOHN R. LOGAN, 
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: THE NEIGHBORHOOD GAP FOR BLACKS, HISPANICS, AND ASIANS 
IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA (2011); PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN 
NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF PROGRESS TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY (2013).  But see 
Lincoln Quillian, Segregation as a Source of Contextual Advantage: A Formal Theory with 
Application to American Cities, 3 RSF: RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 152 (2017) 
(arguing that income is very important to understanding how segregation or 
desegregation affects racialized concentrations of poverty and affluence). 
146. WILLIAM J. WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1997). 
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the services necessary to address the social consequences of such incarceration 
(referred to as “million dollar blocks”).147  According to Mary Patillo, for 
upper-income Blacks, their neighborhoods often adjoin these lower-income 
black neighborhoods.  They experience lower property values, and the 
spillover effects of the concentrated poverty on their neighborhoods.148  Thus, 
the Black middle-class experience comes with a somewhat paradoxical 
deprivation—the paradoxical decreased ability to as effectively exclude lower-
income housing experienced by white middle-class neighborhood 
residents.149  Mixing could theoretically ameliorate these consequences. 
E. Mixing and Attaining Integration 
1. Defining Integration 
Mixing is a principle and method designed to accomplish the goal of 
integration.  Because of the difficulty in coming up with an operational 
definition of integration, it is challenging to develop consistent, principled 
standards for mixing.  The question is rarely asked is how much mixing is 
required to count as mixing. Instead, the principle or method threatens to 
become the goal itself, rather than serving as a means to a desired end.  The 
assumption is that the mixing principle is the same as the goal of integration.  
This is similar to the diversity principle in affirmative action litigation, where 
the method or technique of diversity to accomplish integration has become 
an end in itself, diversity is now the goal rather than a means to a desired 
 
147. See James Austin et al., Sentencing Project, Ending Mass Incarceration: Charting A New 
Justice Reinvestment 5 (2013). (“The most locally concentrated pockets of incarceration 
were dubbed “Million Dollar Blocks,” because of the millions being spent each year on 
prison cells for high proportions of working-age male residents for an average of three 
years.  Million dollar blocks dramatized the tradeoffs for specific neighborhoods between 
locally concentrated incarceration spending policies, and alternative, locally focused investment 
policies that could yield greater returns in public safety, strengthened community institutions, 
and expanded neighborhood networks.”); Jennifer Gonnerman, Million-Dollar Blocks: The 
Neighborhood Costs of America’s Prison Boom, VILLAGE VOICE (2004), 
http://www.november.org/stayinfo/breaking2/Millions.html [https://perma.cc /3FK5-
6HKP] (reprinted in TARA HERIVEL& PAUL WRIGHT, PRISON PROFITEERS: WHO MAKES 
MONEY FROM MASS INCARCERATION (2009)); Geoge C. Galster, Jackie M. Cutsinger & Ron 
Malega, The Costs of Concentrated Poverty: Neighborhood Property Markets and the 
Dynamics of Decline, in REVISITING RENTAL HOUSING: POLICIES, PROGRAMS, AND 
PRIORITIES 93, 94–96 (Nicolas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2008). 
148. PATILLO, supra note 145, at 30, 87.  See also Bart Landry & Kris Marsh, The Evolution of 
the New Black Middle Class, 37 ANN. REV. SOC. 373 (2011) (discussing black middle class 
and racial residential segregation). 
149. See Patrick Sharkey, Spatial Segmentation and the Black Middle Class, 119 AM. J. SOC. 903 
(2014); McFarlane, supra note 65. 
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policy end.150  Mixing likewise becomes an end that leads to failure to identify 
standards for how or why it should be accomplished.  
There is a tendency to be vague about mixing because defining 
integration is hard.  The literal definition of integration is “[t]he process of 
making whole or combining into one.” 151  It is estimated that attaining perfect 
residential integration, according to the dissimilarity index, would require all 
Blacks to move based on the segregation index in the metropolitan region.152  This 
clinical definition of integration raises the question of whether, and why, we 
want to achieve this.153  The unstated assumptions are that there are no 
appreciable differences between Blacks and Whites and that  community 
among black people is undesirable and unnecessary.154  The National Research 
Council definition suggests an alternate, more fully developed definition of 
integration: 
Complete integration exists in a multiracial institution if: (1) there 
is significant numerical representation for each group; (2) each 
group is distributed throughout the institutional structure; and (3) 
each group enjoys equality, authority, and power within the 
institution.  These conditions will not develop . . . unless equal 
status of the races is achieved, common superordinate goals exist 
for all, and the process has authoritative sanction and support.155 
 
150. See Lesley A. Jacobs, Integration, Diversity, and Affirmative Action, 32 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 
725, 728 (1998) (arguing for pursuing both an integration rationale and the diversity 
rationale for affirmative action). 
151. See Integration, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
152. MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 98, at 20 (“The standard measure of segregation is the 
index of dissimilarity, which captures the degree to which blacks and whites are evenly 
spread among neighborhoods in a city . . .  The index of dissimilarity gives the 
percentage of blacks who would have to move to achieve an ‘even’ residential pattern—
one where every neighborhood replicates the racial composition of the city.”).  
153. See generally ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION (2013). 
154. John O. Calmore, Spatial Equality and the Kerner Commission Report: A Back-to-the-
Future Essay, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1487, 1497 n.46 (1993) (“Although blacks and whites share 
consensus on an abstract goal of achieving an integrated and equalitarian society, ‘their 
images of what constitute integrated, equalitarian, and racially harmonious conditions 
are often different or contradictory . . . and [their] perceptions of the genesis and 
reproduction of group inequality are sharply divergent.’”). 
155. GERALD DAVID JAYNES, ROBIN M. WILLIAMS, JR., EDS., A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND 
AMERICAN SOCIETY (1989), supra note 154, at 57 (italics added).  See Minow, supra note 
124, at 600; 602 (“As Dr. King described it, integration involves the creation of a 
community of relationships among people who view one another as valuable, who take 
pride in one another’s contributions, and who appreciate differences and know that 
commonalities and synergies outweigh any extra efforts that bridging differences may require. 
… In integrated communities, people’s differences become a resource, opening avenues for 
learning, exchange, self-invention, and self-extension through connections, 
Discrimination Management  1177 
Yet, none of the theoretical definitions acknowledge the tension caused 
by an ongoing white preference for segregation that exists in tandem with 
integration efforts.156  The definition of integration that underlies many such 
policy efforts relies heavily on the elusive elements of social acceptance, and 
probably explain why we have not yet achieved it meaningfully.157  If, as 
discussed above, white space is highly valued as a hoarded resource,158 
integration means something far more radical than merely desegregating—it 
means accepting Blacks, possibly in substantial numbers, into areas that are 
cherished for being exclusively white areas.  Integration has been problematic due 
to these inherent group inequality and power differentials that are attendant 
to America’s history of racial segregation.  Yet, focusing integration efforts 
more directly on disrupting the group inequality and power differentials is 
potentially politically fraught.  In this challenging context, integration’s first 
goal is to establish a norm of mixing as nonsegregation and then see that the 
principle is followed in community planning and design.  Second, it has to 
define what that mixing should look like in ways that fulfill antidiscrimination 
principles.  Third, from an efficacy standpoint, it has to face entrenched 
attachment to both segregation and discrimination, as well as the financial 
and political ability to circumvent.  In particular, this challenge is 
compounded by the effects of segregation, namely that non-middle-class 
Black integration remains the primary battleground. 
2. The Fair Housing Act as the Prevailing Legal Norm for Integration 
Desegregation and integration legislation faced a daunting challenge of 
ending a destructive practice that the majority perceived to be tangibly 
beneficial.  Law makers sought to do so in a manner that would not offend or 
upset that majority who felt a perceived property right to discriminate based 
on race was being circumscribed.  The formal adoption of antidiscrimination 
 
disagreements, and identifications with people sharing multiple lines of similarity and 
difference.”).   
156. See Cara Wong, Would We Know ‘Integration If We Were to See It?’  Measurement and 
the Imperative of Integration, 12 POL. STUD. REV. 353 (2014) (summarizing the 
quantitative challenges of defining and measuring integration). 
157. Rodney A. Smolla, In Pursuit of Racial Utopias: Fair Housing, Quotas, and Goals in the 
1980’s, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 947 (1985) (arguing that racial integration been essentially 
written out of U.S. Supreme Court doctrine). 
158. See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1746 (1993) 
(“After the dismantling of legalized race segregation, whiteness took on the character of 
property in the modern sense in that relative white privilege was legitimated as the status 
quo.”). 
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principles with respect to housing began with the 1968 federal Fair Housing 
Act (FHA).159  The legislation’s sponsors saw the contradiction of American 
ideals of liberty and mobility by allowing the exclusion of Blacks with financial 
resources as one of the most blatant manifestations of the harms of rampant 
discrimination.  Since then, the legislation has been understood as using the 
prohibition on discrimination to attain integration as a complementary 
goal.160  The necessary first step to implementing integration was to remove 
artificial barriers to geographic mobility that restricted racial minorities of 
economic means from moving out of ghetto areas.   
Reflecting the realpolitik of the era, desegregation was couched in the 
language of discrimination based on racial identity, as well as other prohibited 
identity categories, but was in fact class-based in terms of who would be able 
to take advantage of its’ provisions—mainly affluent and upper middle-class 
black homeowners aspiring to purchase or rent in white neighborhoods that 
were formerly off limits.  When the Act prohibited exclusion of individuals 
seeking to rent or purchase housing,  the drafters knew and, in search of votes, 
explicitly assured legislators that very few Blacks would be able to take 
advantage of the Act’s protections because relatively few would have the 
resources to purchase housing.161  Black exit was always assumed to be to the 
suburbs, where the jobs were located but, simultaneously understood to be 
economically unobtainable locations.  The legislation’s promise was mobility 
 
159. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2015).  At the height of agitation for “open 
housing,” the Supreme Court revived the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in Jones v. Mayer 
making available the statute’s broad antidiscrimination principles with respect to 
property ownership.  Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
160. See Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2507, 2521–22, 2525–26 (2015) (recognizing the FHA’s goal was to achieve integrated 
communities by, among other things, eliminating barriers from zoning); see Robert G. 
Schwemm, Segregative-Effect Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL'Y 709, 715 (2017) (“[E]arly Supreme Court and lower-court decisions 
[recognized] the statute should be interpreted broadly to achieve its goal of 
integration.”). 
161. 114 CONG. REC. 2279 (1968) (statement of Sen. Brooke) (“Fair housing does not promise 
to end the ghetto; it promises only to demonstrate that the ghetto is not an immutable 
institution in America.  It will scarcely lead to a mass dispersal of the ghetto population 
to the suburbs; but it will make it possible for those who have the resources to escape the 
stranglehold now suffocating the inner cities of America.”); 114 CONG. REC. 2525 (1968) 
(statement of Sen. Brooke) (“This measure, as we have said so often before, will not tear 
down the ghetto.  It will merely unlock the door for those who are able and choose to 
leave.  I cannot imagine a step so modest, yet so significant, as the proposal now before 
the Senate.”); 114 CONG. REC. 3421 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale) (“[T]he basic 
purpose of the legislation is to permit people who have the ability to do so to buy any 
house offered to the public if they can afford to buy it.  It would not overcome the 
economic problem of those who could not afford to purchase the house of their choice.”). 
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for those in the ghetto who had the financial means and the emotional 
stamina to experience hostility to their arrival.  The FHA promoted a version 
of integration informed by stark principles of individualism,162 limiting the 
scope and reach of its integrative potential, and thus making it palatable for 
adoption. 
The proponents intended to address the income gap in ability to 
purchase housing through companion federal legislation that made funds 
available for homeownership.  This legislation also intended for low- and 
moderate-income housing to be built outside of “the ghetto” in the suburbs.163  
This income gap illustrates that attaining integration, being able to live 
outside of black ghetto areas in cities and in white areas in the suburbs, closer 
to jobs, had two dimensions: 1) integration for Blacks  with financial means 
to be mobile and move where desired; and 2) integration for Blacks without 
financial means, who needed financial support to acquire or rent homes, as 
well as, new homes built outside of inner city areas.  It is this second aspect of 
the integration challenge that continues today—the need for lower income, 
non-middle-class integration.  The federal government has struggled ever 
since to find a way to make white communities to accept racial integration, in 
general, and specifically integration of non-wealthy Blacks.164 
 
162. EDWARD WILLIAM BROOKE, THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE: CRISIS IN OUR TWO-PARTY 
SYSTEM (1966) (explaining his centrist, progressive conservative beliefs in both limited 
government, robust civil rights and social uplift through access to the free market).  See 
also Leah Wright Rigueur, Neoliberal Social Justice: From Ed Brooke to Barack Obama, 
ITEMS: INSIGHTS FROM SOC. SCI. (May 30, 2017) (ascribing to Sen. Brooks a black 
neoliberal ideology that finds solutions to racial inequality in wealth via individual 
success in the free market), http://items.ssrc.org/neoliberal-social-justice-from-ed-
brooke-to-barack-obama [https://perma.cc/S3SJ-P3FD]. 
163. See RICHARD K. GREEN & STEPHEN MALPEZZI, A PRIMER ON U.S. HOUSING MARKETS AND 
HOUSING POLICY 92, 96–98 (2003). The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 
contained programs to provide homeownership for the poor through interest rate 
subsidies for low- and moderate-income families to purchase houses (Section 235 
Homeowner Assistance Program) and interest rate subsides for developers who agreed 
to build and lease dwellings to low-income persons in suburban locations (Section 236 
Rental Assistance Act).  Id. 
164. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).  A 
proposed development that would be racially integrated was denied by a town that was 
99 percent white.  The effort to integrate was entitled to no higher land use protection 
because the U.S. Constitution was deemed insensitive to racial exclusion and segregation. 
Id. Thus, the Constitution would only respond where the official was not savvy enough 
to avoid letting bad thoughts be known.  Under this rationale, the ordinary rules of 
zoning granted a collective right to exclude.  Id.  
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What does it mean that the primary legislative vehicle for advancing 
integration adopted a less than radical definition of integration?165  The 
pragmatism reflected in the bill certainly reflects only glimmers of an ideal, 
tempered by the reality of of staunch attachment to racial segregation.  
Unwilling, or perhaps unable, to confront such opposition, the FHA utilized 
a limited prohibitory approach and promoted a very limited form of 
integration when it advanced housing laws that, in theory, opened up housing 
markets to everyone regardless of race.  However, it did not address the 
structural discrimination that would make it impossible for all but a limited 
number of elite Blacks to escape the ghetto.166  The drafters’ vision was to 
dismantle ghetto by allowing middle-class Blacks to access the level of housing 
their incomes would actually allow.  The drafters were acutely aware of the 
need to deal with Blacks left in the ghetto.  But rather than incorporate them 
explicitly into a vision of integration, the FHA opted for the more politically 
feasible route of managing discrimination by maneuvering around it.  The 
FHA’s remedy then and now is to attain integration through mobility to escape 
from the segregated, low-income neighborhoods for the black poor.  Low- and 
moderate-income housing programs, such as the Section 235 program, were 
intended to be complementary legislation that would provide access for 
lower-income Blacks through purchasing power.167  Funds were also intended 
to increase the supply of low-cost housing in suburban areas.  The first 
program ended in a scandal of predatory abuse.168 
 
165. JORGE ANDRES SOTO & DEIDRE SWESNIK, AM. CONST. SOC’Y ISSUE BRIEF, THE PROMISE OF 
THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND THE ROLE OF FAIR HOUSING ORGANIZATIONS 17 (2012) 
(“[I]ntegration is thought of as a dream and not a possible reality . . . .”). 
166. 114 CONG. REC. 2278 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale) (“[A] substantial market of 
financially able Negroes [are] prevented from buying housing of their choice because of deeply 
entrenched patterns of discrimination in the sale and rental of housing in our country.”). 
167. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 235, 82 Stat. 476, 476–77 
(1968) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 401(d), 101 Stat. 1898, 1899 (1988)).  See Michael H. 
Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and Policy: Concentrated 
Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285, 1312 (1995) (“Section 235 was designed to 
make capital more available to lower-income urban homebuyers.  From 1969 to 1979, 
approximately 500,000 homes were purchased under the program.  Nevertheless, in several 
cities, rather than stabilizing inner-city communities, Section 235 promoted rapid neighborhood 
racial transition and, in some instances, decline.”). 
168. Audrey G. McFarlane, The Properties of Instability: Markets, Predation, Racialized Geography, 
and Property Law, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 855, 895–96 (2011) (describing the predation connected 
with the Section 235 program, the companion legislation to the FHA).  See Priya S. Gupta, 
Governing the Single-Family House: A (Brief) Legal History, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 187, 218, 223 
(2015) (for an insightful argument about the reification of the single-family house and the white 
nuclear family in law and policy and the prerogative to exclude multifamily housing). 
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Yet, the Act’s vision of integration was at best gradual, certainly minimal.  
It seems fair to say the vision was of not pure integration but of a minimal 
amount deemed bearable—antidiscrimination provisions that only reached 
affluent or middle-class racial integration.  This was understood at that time as an 
inherent limitation to the legislation’s potential, which paradoxically doubled as 
a selling point.169  Today, it is the problem of non-middle class, lower-income 
racial segregation that continues to pose the biggest challenge.170 
Today, the Fair Housing Act does more to treat the structural aspect of 
segregation as an obstacle to integration.  The Supreme Court in Inclusive 
Communities v. Texas validated a longstanding view that a FHA claim was not 
limited to intentional discrimination, but could also challenge decisions 
resulting in disparate racial impact.  This interpretation included decisions 
that perpetuated segregation by promoting community segregative effect, in 
effect, recognizing that the FHA could be violated by structure: Habitual 
practices of financing and implementing the construction and location of 
affordable housing could have a disparate impact on minorities.171  By not 
requiring proof of discriminatory intent, the Court recognized that past 
practices shaped a racial geographical hierarchy such that today’s government 
approval of new development projects, whether intentional or not, could 
perpetuate segregation.172  This other aspect of the FHA that sought to address 
structural barriers to integration was by requiring the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development  (HUD) to monitor the structural effects of federal 
funding, and to “affirmatively further”  Fair Housing.173  This has been 
understood to mean, at the very least, federal funds should not be used by 
 
169. See supra note 161. 
170. See Wendell E. Pritchett, Where Shall We Live?  Class and the Limitations of Fair Housing 
Law, 35 URB. L. 399 (2003). 
171. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 
2522–23 (2015) (recognizing that the FHA encompasses disparate impact liability, but 
allowing leeway to housing authorities and private developers to explain and prove that 
the policy in question serves a valid interest and requiring the plaintiff to make a prima 
facie case for discriminatory impact). 
172. Id. 
173. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d), (e)(5) (2006) (“All executive departments and agencies shall 
administer their programs and activities relating to housing and urban development 
(including any Federal agency having regulatory or supervisory authority over financial 
institutions) in a manner affirmatively to further the purposes of [the FHA] and shall 
cooperate with the Secretary [of HUD] to further such purposes.”).  For a discussion of 
the history of this provision, see Robert G. Schwemm, Overcoming Structural Barriers to 
Integrated Housing, 100 KY. L.J. 125, 126–28 (2011). 
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local governments to perpetuate segregation.174  Federally subsidized 
affordable housing programs, as well as infrastructure subsidies which were 
crucial to building racially integrated, workforce housing were rendered 
ineffective by Executive Policy and inaction at HUD to use subsidized housing 
funds to carry out this process.175  During the Obama Administration, HUD 
comprehensively addressed this problem by adopting an extensive regulations 
on advancing fair housing.176  Today, those regulations are in limbo.177 
After the passage of the FHA, exclusionary practices continued largely 
unchecked.178  As discussed above, poorly designed programs like the Section 
235 program were exploited and failed to implement obvious solutions.179  
Federal efforts by the Department of Housing and Urban Development were 
 
174. See David D. Troutt, Inclusion Imagined: Fair Housing as Metropolitan Equity, 65 BUFF. L. REV. 
5, 45–46 (2017) (“The breadth of the definition of AFFH is almost limitless . . . the 
definition . . . dislodges the anti-segregation aspect of the [FHA] from the anti-discrimination 
prong.”); 114 Cong. Rec. H3422 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1968); Schmidt v. Bos. Hous. Auth., 505 F. 
Supp. 988, 996 n.1 (D. Mass. 1981) (quoting 114 CONG. RECORD 2527–28 (1968) (statement of 
Sen. Brooke)) (“Today’s Federal housing official commonly inveighs against the evils of ghetto 
life even as he pushes buttons that ratify their triumph—even as he ok’s public housing sites in 
the heart of Negro slums, releases planning and urban renewal funds to cities dead-set against 
integration, and approves the financing of suburban subdivisions from which Negroes will be 
barred.  These and similar acts are committed daily by officials who say they are unalterably 
opposed to segregation, and have memos to prove it.”).  
175. See LAMB, supra note 118, at 146, 159–60 (describing Nixon’s 1971 policy statement on 
fair housing which promised suburbs not to force economic integration on them and to 
defer to local control to promote racial integration on a voluntary basis). 
176. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2012); 24 C.F.R. § 5.152 (2016) (stating that affirmatively 
furthering fair housing means “taking meaningful actions that, taken together, address 
significant disparities in housing needs and in access to opportunity, replacing 
segregated living patterns with truly integrated and balanced living patterns, 
transforming racially and ethnically concentrated areas of poverty into areas of 
opportunity, and fostering and maintaining compliance with civil rights and fair housing 
laws”). 
177. See Policy Minute: HUD Delays Critical Fair Housing Requirement, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR: 
RES. & POL’Y. (Mar. 9, 2018), http://furmancenter.org/thestoop/entry/policy-minute-
hud-delays-critical-fair-housing-requirement [https://perma.cc/9W3B-LLKR]. 
178. SHARKEY, supra note 145, at 53.  See Schwemm, supra note 173, at 176 (“[T]he 2000 
Census demonstrated that, while residential racial segregation of Blacks has been 
declining slightly, it still is at such high levels that if it continued to decline at the same 
rate, it would be decades before a moderate level of segregation were reached.”); see also 
Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Integration Game, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1965, 
1975 (2000) (“The magnitude of the [racial segregation in housing] problem has 
remained relatively static over the last half century.”). 
179. Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, The Spatial Bias of Federal Housing Law and Policy: 
Concentrated Poverty in Urban America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1285, 1312–13 (1995). 
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thwarted.180  Many of the high poverty black neighborhoods of the 1960s continue 
to be the high poverty neighborhoods of today.181 
The structure of the FHA and its trajectory of ineffective enforcement 
for low-income Blacks reflects that in a capitalist society, access to racial 
integration through law will always be mediated by class.  The reality that 
there are, in effect, two types of integration—middle class and non-middle 
class—also means that mobility for one group comes with immobility for 
another, resulting in unaddressed costs and tension.  The ability to integrate 
for the black middle class is simultaneously the right to withdraw from the 
poor.182  While the FHA appears to address a fundamental deprivation of a 
right based on one’s skin color and African heritage, it imperfectly addressed 
that the right can also be denied by income which is structured by race.  This, 
however, is consistent with the American world view that a denial based on 
income would not be a legally cognizable harm and nor should it be.183 
III. MIXED-INCOME HOUSING AS DISCRIMINATION MANAGEMENT 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the challenge for mixing is 
the need and habit of discrimination via the race and class expectation of 
domination.  Racial segregation reflects racially discriminatory preferences 
that are habitual and based on aversion, fear, and stereotype.  It reflects social 
networks, and their communicated perceptions of desirability, connection, 
and safety.  Lastly, racial segregation reflects financial investments in status 
and fierce defense of that status against inclusion.  The result is metropolitan 
areas characterized by racialized concentrations of poverty and affluence that 
reflect overinvestments and disinvestments and result in drastically different 
living experiences based on race and class.  At the extremes, there are 
neighborhoods filled with amenities and others starved of amenities and 
overpoliced.  Thus, this geographic manifestations of race and class 
discrimination are demonstrably deeply embedded, highly valued, and nearly 
impossible to dislodge. 
 
180. See LAMB, supra note 118, at 159–60 (detailing George Romney’s determined efforts to 
enforce the affirmatively further mandate). 
181. Douglas S. Massey, Inheritance of Poverty or Inheritance of Place?  The Emerging 
Consensus on Neighborhoods and Stratification, 42 CONTEMP. SOC. 690, 693 (2013) (“The 
same neighborhoods that were disadvantaged in 2000 were disadvantaged in 1990, not 
to mention 1980, 1970, and 1960.”). 
182. For a fuller explanation of this argument, see McFarlane, supra note 65, at 168–69. 
183. See ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: AN INTRODUCTION 16–
23 (2006) (“[C]oncluding that the case for fostering greater income integration is not yet 
proven.”). 
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By prohibiting racial discrimination in housing,184  we have declared it 
unlawful to deny opportunities for housing on the basis of race or that bear more 
heavily on a protected group.  This prohibition reflects two distinct but interrelated 
understandings of antidiscrimination protections.  One understanding is based on a 
colorblind anticlassification principle which formally treats race as an arbitrary, 
invalid criterion.  Implicit in the formal prohibition is the concern that 
individuals subject to arbitrary treatment are deprived of basic rights and their 
ability to survive or thrive.  The cumulative effect for a group of people 
consistently subjected to such treatment is subordination or second-class 
citizenship.  The anticlassification principle is in tension, however, with 
antisubordination concerns.  Many assume that formal prohibitions on racial 
classification prevent any consideration of race in efforts to ameliorate 
negative conditions or improve the circumstances of a subordinated group.185  
While this assumption has certainly been considered extensively in the 
affirmative action context,186 little if any attention has been paid to a corollary 
principle or concern—is it ever proper to take into account, during policy 
making, a preference for discrimination?  Despite legal proscriptions against 
discrimination, discrimination certainly persists.  When Derrick Bell 
famously observed that racism was permanent, it seemed a hopeless, even 
demoralizing, observation.187  Yet it turns out that this insight is borne out by 
data showing the enduring nature of racial disparities,188 and is also consistent 
with the social domination theory’s insights that an integral part of social 
relations and psychology in the United States are the  individual and 
institutional actions that create and maintain a social hierarchy. 
How should the omnipresence of discrimination be reflected in law, 
advocacy, and policy?  As mixed-income housing policy shows, we tacitly 
understand, and policies reflect, that we often concede or cater to a certain 
 
184. See John A. Powell, Reflections on the Past, Looking to the Future: The Fair Housing Act 
at 40, 18 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. 605, 615 (2008) (“The focus on anti-discrimination 
normative measures has served to increase the freedom of choice for homebuyers, but it 
has not necessarily helped produce integrated neighborhoods or addressed segregated 
living patterns.”). 
185. Neil Gotanda, Failure of the Color-Blind Vision: Race, Ethnicity, and the California Civil 
Rights Initiative, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1135, 1138–41 (1996). 
186. Ann C. McGinley, The Emerging Cronyism Defense and Affirmative Action: A Critical 
Perspective on the Distinction Between Colorblind and Race-Conscious Decision Making 
Under Title VII, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003, 1046–48 (1997). 
187. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 
(1993);  DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 
153 (1989). 
188. See, e.g., Sharkey supra note 145, at 54. 
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amount of discrimination.  These policies show that we, both consciously and 
unconsciously, manage discrimination by catering to it, even as we say we 
want to fight it.  The poor door and its parent, mixed-income housing, force 
us to consider the extent to which existing preference for discrimination may 
validly be factored into our integration efforts.  Is it ever morally just to 
concede to discrimination?189  When?  How much discrimination is tolerable?  
How much is too much? What should policymakers do?190 
In the face of what seems to be an enduring geography of race and class 
separation in housing, a mixed-income housing scheme is certainly a creative 
discrimination management response.  Such schemes tacitly take 
discriminatory preferences, like preferences for homogeneity or dislikes that 
manifest in aversion, into account and accommodate them.  This is 
discrimination management—pragmatically considering discrimination as 
inevitable and managing it by working to cater to some dimensions of it while 
carefully working around other parts of it.  Yet engaging in such 
discrimination management is an unacknowledged fraught endeavor.  The 
New York City and London poor doors were crude, stigmatizing efforts to 
overtly cater to discriminatory impulses.  The doors were not mere matters of 
convenience but a way of signaling preferred or high status to some users and 
lack of status to others.  Accordingly, the poor doors demonstrate that the 
overall project of mixed-income housing has managed discrimination in a 
manner that is not self-aware nor self-critical.  Mixed-income housing 
uncritically accepts discriminatory preferences as justified because they 
mirror policymakers’ own biases and what they consider to be desirable living 
arrangements.  Moreover, low-income persons are stereotyped and cut off 
from receiving the valuable resource of housing because they are defined as as 
only eligible for a limited share.  Managing discrimination in this way leads to 
a housing scarcity that perpetuates, if not exacerbates, the problem it intended 
to solve.  The ways in which mixed-income housing has been conceived and 
 
189. See ROBERT C. POST, PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES–THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 22 (2001); DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION 
WRONG? (2008). 
190. Scholars have partially considered these questions in Supreme Court Equal Protection 
jurisprudence with the observation that, over time, antidiscrimination protections have 
been minimized to avoid political backlash and prevent perceived balkanization.  Reva 
Siegel argues that recent Supreme Court decisions have reflected an antibalkanization 
principle: The Court has “voted to uphold and to restrict race conscious remedies 
because of concern about social divisiveness which, they believe, both extreme racial 
stratification and unconstrained racial remedies can engender.”  Reva Siegel, From 
Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality 
Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1278 (2011). 
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deployed through inclusionary zoning suggests we have failed to question 
whether we unacceptably perpetuate discrimination by conceding too much 
to prevailing structures and norms of race and class discrimination in land use.  
As the following discussion will show, mixed-income housing is premised on 
sneaking the poor in, disguising their presence, dispersing them, and avoiding 
a tipping point where the communities would become unattractive to the 
affluent.  It also relies on legitimizing myths like the benefits of role models 
for the poor. 
A. Managing Neighborhood Opposition Through Microintegration 
Since the passage of the FHA, it was understood that desegregation 
would involve mobility of Blacks from cities to suburbs, allowing them to 
follow the trajectory of development, economic activity, and jobs to the 
suburbs.191  As the legislative history demonstrates, the Fair Housing Act of 
1968 was premised on the policy solution of facilitating geographic mobility to 
address the then-recognized problem of spatial mismatch between black people in 
cities needing jobs that were moving to the suburbs.192  The non-middle-class black 
person confined by geography and transportation to the central cities would not 
be able to benefit from such legal proscriptions without  supply-side 
interventions—funding to subsidize low- to moderate-income 
homeownership and funding for construction of affordable housing in 
suburban areas.  The road out of segregation and poverty required a triage 
approach193 to provide both escape and access to amenity-rich places and  their 
associated opportunities—good jobs, well-funded schools, and 
transportation.194 
The effort to promote geographic mobility and integration post FHA was 
largely stymied by exclusionary zoning and neighborhood opposition.195  
Geographic mobility is still believed to be the key to deconcentrating black 
segregation and the cornerstone of housing policy with mixed-income 
housing as the preferred housing design.  According to Patrick Sharkey: 
“ . . . research on neighborhood and the life course demonstrates 
that changes in geographic location—particularly among youth in 
 
191. See Schwemm, supra note 173. 
192. See 114 CONG. REC. 2274 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale). 
193. See 114 CONG. REC. 2991 (1968) (statement of Sen. Brooke) (discussing the complex array of 
solutions needed to promote desegregation). 
194. Id. 
195. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 67, at 52–53, 122–23; KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER 
241–43 (1985). 
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highly segregated cities or metropolitan areas-- frequently lead to 
or coincide with disruptions in patterns of inequality, suggesting 
that when young adults relocate, they will experience the most 
substantial changes to multiple dimensions of their lives.”196 
But the benefits of mobility seem to decline as the ages of the children 
increase.197 
There is also a debate about whether geographic mobility is the answer 
to the consequences of disinvestment in black, segregated, and impoverished 
neighborhoods.  Critics  question mobility’s costs in terms of loss of 
community ties and racial and class isolation in the new jurisdictions.198  Some 
question the impact on communities left behind as the most capable are 
enabled to leave, and instead argue in favor of community development 
strategies that focus on fixing up areas of concentrated poverty instead.199  
Still, others argue that mobility and community development are not 
mutually exclusive.  New developments in both city and suburb should be 
mixed income.  Still, others point out that this facilitates gentrification in 
certain markets.200 
From a housing advocacy point of view, a mobility strategy is still the best 
option to allow lower-income people to access housing that is close to good 
 
196. Patrick Sharkey, Temporary Integration, Resilient Inequality: Race and Neighborhood Change in 
the Transition to Adulthood, 49 DEMOGRAPHY 889, 892 (2012) (citations omitted). 
197. Sharkey, supra note 196, at 905 (“Whereas whites experience slight declines in neighborhood 
poverty as they age beyond 25, the trend toward declining neighborhood poverty among African 
Americans who exit their county of origin flattens and reverses as they age further into 
adulthood.  In early adulthood, there is a clear trend toward racial equality among young adults 
who exit highly segregated metropolitan areas, but the long-term trend suggests a reproduction 
of inequality in neighborhood poverty as black and white young adults move further into 
adulthood.”). 
198. See Mary Pattillo, Investing in Poor Black Neighborhoods ‘As Is’, in PUBLIC HOUSING AND 
THE LEGACY OF SEGREGATION (Margery Austin Turner, Susan J. Popkin, and Lynette 
Rawlings eds., 2009); Sharkey, supra note 145 (arguing for sustained investments in 
nonwhite, low-income communities.). 
199. See Norrinda Brown Hayat, Urban Decolonization, 24 MICH. J. RACE & L. 75 (2018). 
(arguing against mobility programs and in favor of community development).  See also 
Calmore, supra note 154, at 1492, 1507 (arguing that policy should emphasize spatial 
equality which would be a form of “territorial reparations” and link black interests across 
class lines). 
200. See, e.g., Samuel Dastrup & Ingrid Gould Ellen, Linking Residents to Opportunity: 
Gentrification and Public Housing, 18 CITYSCAPE (2016) (exemplifying the kinds of 
markets where mixed-income redevelopment would provide increased housing 
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employment, schools, and transportation.201  Mixed-income housing presents an 
effective way  to avoid one of the enduring obstacles to construction of affordable 
housing—neighbor opposition.202  That opposition is generally based on negative 
assumptions about the racial identity and socioeconomic status of the potential 
residents of a proposed development, and the perceived impact on one’s 
neighborhood’s status and property values.  Such neighborhood opposition is 
situational as well as structural, taking the form of vigorous neighborhood 
objections. Such opposition becomes embedded in zoning ordinances that 
make multifamily housing discretionary with willing enforcement by public 
officials.203  Mixed-income housing, as such,  is an integration strategy 
premised on microintegration—suburbs would also have to allow multifamily 
housing to be developed, which may be supported by federal funding through 
Section 8 vouchers.  Objections are avoided by building upscale, market-rate 
multifamily housing with a set aside of a smattering of subsidized units.  The 
advantage of microintegration is that developments can be built so lower-
income units are not visible.  A building or development could retain an 
upper-income status because the overall image is middle or upper middle 
class, while ostensibly serving a social purpose.  Because mixed-income 
housing’s microintegration is small, happening on an almost imperceptible 
level, the poor can, in effect, be sneaked into the suburbs in ways not possible 
before.  Integration would happen in a stealth manner by educating existing 
residents that such developments are not that bad, while also maintaining a 
middle-class reputational dignity for the area.  This reputational dignity 
 
201. See JOHN POWELL, REMEDIAL PHASE EXPERT REPORT OF JOHN POWELL IN THOMPSON V. HUD (2005), 
http://www.kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/reports/2005/9_2005_ThompsonvHUDRemedialReport
.pdf.  See generally Florence Wagman Roisman, Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing in 
Regional Housing Markets: The Baltimore Public Housing Desegregation Litigation, 42 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 333, 348 (2007) (“Studies of these mobility programs have shown a variety of 
important benefits for the families who were enabled to move and for the community at large.  
The benefits involve not only education and employment, but also health, environmental, and 
economic advantages.”). 
202. See John Zipperer, The Debate Over Mixed-Income Housing, AFFORDABLE HOUS. FIN. (Jan. 1, 
2006), http://www.housingfinance.com/management-operations/the-debate-over-mixed-
income-housing_o [https://perma.cc/J747-D75Y] (“ [T]he lesson some people drew from the 
failure of public housing: We just had too many poor people; therefore we’ll kind of hide the poor 
people in these mixed-income developments and good things will happen to them.”). 
203. See Nguyen, supra note 115.  See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252 (1977) (refusing to take cognizance of opposition to affordable housing based 
on perceived black identity of residents); Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 
538 U.S. 188 (2003); City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976).  
These are only select examples.  The examples of neighborhood opposition to affordable 
housing are numerous, if not ubiquitous. 
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would likewise extend to the lower-income residents by allowing them to 
avoid the stigma of affordable housing.204 
There are consequences, however, of requiring the poor residents to 
sneak into a community to ameliorate opposition to their presence.  First, by 
necessity, inclusionary housing is focused on only new developments, leaving 
existing exclusionary zoning intact, like a magnet school or a magnet place 
approach.  This “magnet place”205 approach pretends that integration is now 
a product to be marketed.  However, this is a limited, controlled, and often 
illusory integration.  Several obvious limits include the relatively small 
number of units produced by the minimal set aside approach.  The units are 
usually affordable for the moderate-income person rather than the low- or 
very low-income person who requires an individual, stigmatizing subsidy.206  
Also, because mixed-income housing development is a way to work around 
existing patterns of segregation, by hiding integration’s presence and avoiding 
neighbor opposition, it grants access to areas, services, and amenities that would 
otherwise be unavailable.  It also simply provides a place to live.  But thorny 
issues about how to fairly design these communities are rarely considered 
openly.  Instead, design is often only discussed in terms of financial viability 
(how many subsidized units can the developer afford) when in fact, social 
assumptions and presumed discomforts shape the entire conception of the 
mixed-income project.  This means that the number and types of these units 
will likely remain low, resulting in far fewer affordable housing units than are 
needed to address the unmet demand.  
 
204. See MOLLY M. SCOTT ET AL., POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL, EXPANDING CHOICE: 
PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING A SUCCESSFUL HOUSING MOBILITY PROGRAM 34 (2013) 
(advocacy guide explaining when seeking to create a housing mobility program to consider 
avoiding using terms like “affordable housing” to avoid property owner and community leader 
resistance.) https://www.prrac.org/pdf/ExpandingChoice.pdf [https://perma.cc/4U2N-A6FS]. 
205. See James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 YALE 
L.J. 2043, 2064–65 (2002) (“Like traditional alternative schools, magnet schools typically 
offer specialized programs or curricular themes . . . [and are] designed to encourage 
racial integration . . . .”). 
206. See Ellickson, supra note 9, at 1011 (“[T]he recipients of many inclusionary housing units 
are themselves middle-class suburbanites.”).  Ellickson also argues that states with 
inclusionary zoning policies continue to “impose unusually severe legal constraints on 
housing supply.  Collectively, their perverse policies include exclusionary zoning 
practices, strict growth controls, and complex environmental reporting requirements 
that enable opponents to delay (and sometimes derail) proposed housing developments.”  
Id. at 1020–21. 
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B. Managing by (Over) Elevating Concentration of Poverty Theory  
Mixed-income housing’s microintegration approach means that each 
building has a limited number of units for low- to moderate-income 
residents.207  The low ratio of lower-income units is considered to have 
distinct internal benefits within the new community.208  Mixed-income 
housing  is often justified as avoiding a new concentration of poverty and its 
ill-effects, called neighborhood effects, or at least as allowing them to be 
managed and counteracted.209  Under this logic, one could assume that the 
fewer poor residents the better.  After all, the conditions in areas of concentrated 
poverty speak for themselves.  First, residents of racially segregated areas of high 
poverty are subject to high rates of violent crime—“high-poverty environments 
are criminogenic, encouraging youth to pursue criminal rather than 
legitimate careers.”210  Second, the poor experience spatial mismatch between 
places where jobs are available and where they reside.211  Third, schools in 
areas of concentrated poverty tend to be educationally ineffective and have 
high dropout rates.212  These facts seem to reflect common sense that 
concentrated poverty and the correlated negative neighborhood effects are 
results of the actions and decisions of poor neighborhood residents.213 
Yet assumptions about the concentration of poverty underlying the 
support for mixed-income housing have been decontextualized and 
overstated.  The concentration of poverty thesis is premised on the 
 
207. See Constantine E. Kontokosta, Mixed-Income Housing and Neighborhood Integration: 
Evidence from Inclusionary Zoning Programs, 36 J. URB. AFF. 716, 737–38 (2016) 
(comparing efficacy of two communities’ inclusionary zoning programs in promoting 
racial and economic integration and diversity). 
208. Id.  See also Tim Iglesias, Maximizing Inclusionary Zoning’s Contributions to Both 
Affordable Housing and Residential Integration, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 585 (2015). 
209. See generally Jacob W. Faber & Patrick Sharkey, Neighborhood Effects, INTL. ENCY. SOC. 
& BEHAV. SCI. 443 (2015) (reviewing data and literature of neighborhood effects). 
210. Lincoln Quillian, Segregation and Poverty Concentration, The Role of Three Segregations, 
77 AM. SOC. REV. 354, 355 (2012). 
211. Id. 
212. Id. 
213. See NAT’L COMM’N ON SEVERELY DISTRESSED PUB. HOUS., A FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 
AND THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT (1992); John O. Calmore, 
Racialized Space and the Culture of Segregation: Hewing A Stone of Hope from a Mountain 
of Despair, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1243–46 (1995) (rejecting “culture of segregation” 
justifications for integration as failing to acknowledge structural reasons for conditions 
in high poverty black neighborhoods); Laura M. Tach, More Than Bricks and Mortar: 
Neighborhood Frames, Social Processes, and the Mixed-Income Redevelopment of a Public 
Housing Project, 8 CITY & COMMUNITY 269, 273–74 (2009) (describing a process of framing 
neighborhoods that creates narratives of neighborhoods based on selective perceptions that are 
filtered through cultural categories.). 
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hyperconcentration of poverty learned through the history of public 
housing’s perpetuation of the racialized concentration of poverty.  The 
sociological literature indicates, however, that concentrated poverty is a 
particular geographic phenomenon more correctly understood as a symptom 
rather than a cause.214  It reflects the consequences of decisions made by the 
rest of the society to disinvest from those areas.215  A community that is 
characterized by concentration of poverty will have few to no amenities.  That 
is a function of the behavior of the wider society towards that neighborhood 
rather than any inherent characteristic of the neighborhood itself.  Relatedly, 
Ruth Person and Lauren Krivo have documented that the level of crime, 
disorder, and violence in high poverty neighborhoods varies by race and class, 
with white families experiencing a vastly better neighborhood circumstance 
than black and Latino families.216  Their research also shows that when they 
controlled for similarities in educational and socioeconomic characteristics, 
the differences between black and white neighborhoods was reduced 
significantly.217 
With improvements in statistical methods, recent social science research 
examining the neighborhoods effects hypothesis confirms that the impact of 
high poverty on neighborhoods is persistent, has increased over time, and is 
devastating to residents.218  This literature also demonstrates that the 
 
214. See NEIL SMITH, THE NEW URBAN FRONTIER: GENTRIFICATION AND THE REVANCHIST CITY, 
62–63 (1st ed. 1996) (“The physical deterioration and economic devalorization of inner-
city neighborhoods is a strictly logical, “rational” outcome of the operation of the land 
and housing markets.  This is not to suggest it is at all natural, however, for the market 
itself is a social product.  Far from being inevitable, neighborhood decline is the result of 
public and private investment decisions. . . .  [T]here is enough control by, and 
integration of, the investment and development actors in the real estate industry that 
their decisions go beyond a response and actually shape the market.”); Mark Beaulieu & 
Tracey Continelli, Benefits of Segregation for White Communities: A Review of the 
Literature and Directions for Future Research, 15 J. AF. AM. STUDIES 487, 501 (2011) 
(describing the ways in which disinvestment from inner city neighborhoods benefits 
suburban neighborhoods). 
215. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 67. 
216. Lauren J. Krivo, Ruth D. Peterson & Danielle C. Kuhl, Segregation, Racial Structure, and 
Neighborhood Violent Crime, 114 AM. J. SOC. 1765, 1793 (2009). 
217. Ruth D. Peterson & Lauren J. Krivo, Segregated Spatial Locations, Race-Ethnic 
Composition, and Neighborhood Violent Crime, 623 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 
93, 106 (2009) (“[W]e demonstrate that indeed the social and economic character that 
exists within neighborhoods is critical for producing large differentials in violence across 
areas with distinct racial and ethnic compositions.”). 
218. LAURA TACH, ROLF PENDALL & ALEXANDRA DERIAN, WHAT WORKS COLLABORATIVE, 
INCOME MIXING ACROSS SCALES: RATIONALE, TRENDS, POLICIES, PRACTICE, AND RESEARCH 
FOR MORE INCLUSIVE NEIGHBORHOODS AND METROPOLITAN AREAS 12 (2014).  
Concentrated poverty has increased over the past four decades.  Id.  In metropolitan 
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concentration of poverty is a function of exclusion and disinvestment, not a 
cause.  According to Lincoln Quillian, in the United States, a notable 
difference in the typical lives of white, black, and Hispanic people is the 
economic class of the people in their social environments.  White middle-class 
families overwhelmingly live in middle-class neighborhoods and send their 
children to middle-class schools.  Many black and Hispanic middle-class 
parents, however, live in working class or poor neighborhoods and send their 
children to high-poverty schools.  About one in three poor white families live 
in poor neighborhoods and send their children to high-poverty schools, 
compared to two in three poor black and Hispanic families.219 
Quillian has thus developed a more nuanced explanation of the causes 
of the negative effects of racial segregation for concentrated poverty.  
Concentration of poverty involves an interaction between three types of 
segregation: 1) racial segregation of black and Hispanic families from affluent 
white families, 2) intraracial income segregation; and 3) racial segregation of 
working and middle-class Blacks from high- and middle-income members of 
other racial groups.220  These phenomena lead to an accumulation of 
advantage and disadvantage.221 
Approximately 50 percent of Blacks lived in the poorest 25 percent of 
urban neighborhoods for at least two generations while just 7 percent of 
Whites lived in similar neighborhoods.222  These effects have been shown to 
be determined by structurally produced conditions in high poverty 
neighborhoods rather than by family background.223  In particular, the effect 
of poverty concentration and neighborhood circumstances has implications, 
 
areas, the percent of residents in “high poverty” neighborhoods increased from 6.4 
percent in 1970 to 9.1 in 1990, declined to 7.2 percent during the 1990s, and since 2000 
has increased by almost 12 percent.  Id.  Therefore, nearly 30 million people live in high 
poverty neighborhoods, 9.2 million live in census tracts with extreme poverty.  Id.  See 
also Quillian, supra note 210, at 357. Very helpful thank you. 
219. Quillian, supra note 210, at 355. 
220. Quillian, supra note 210, at 375–76.  Quillian clarifies that on the third axis, black and 
Hispanic people differ.  Poor Hispanic people experience less segregation but still tend 
to live with poor, non-Hispanic neighbors.  Thus, reducing segregation for Hispanic 
Americans has a weaker effect in reducing poverty.  Middle class black individuals have 
high contact with poor black people, which contributes to their comparatively fragile 
economic position.  Id. at 376. 
221. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL: THE AMERICAN STRATIFICATION 
SYSTEM (2007) (discussing the concentration of poverty and the concentration of 
affluence as both being inherently problematic). 
222. Massey, supra note 181, at 694 (“According to Sharkey, roughly half of the African 
Americans he studied had lived in the poorest quarter of urban neighborhoods for at 
least two consecutive generations compared with just 7 percent of whites . . . .”). 
223. Id. 
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not so much for upward mobility, but for downward mobility—“the prospects 
for downward mobility are much greater for blacks than whites.”224  Patrick 
Sharkey’s work supports these findings, establishing that Blacks have a 
persistent and unique exposure over multiple generations to concentrated 
poverty that explains the persistence of inequality in income and wealth.225  
According to Patrick Sharkey, “[t]he social environments surrounding 
African Americans . . . make it difficult for families to preserve their 
advantaged position in the income distribution and to transmit these 
advantages to their children.”226 
In its traditionally understood sense, concentration of poverty is 
considered socially and economically destructive, with individual and 
community consequences.  Living in high poverty neighborhoods has been 
shown to be highly detrimental, if not traumatic, especially for children who 
grow up in and attend schools there.227  The negative effects are compounded 
when the poverty in these same neighborhoods is intergenerational.228  The 
individual consequences of poverty concentration include “involvement in 
criminal activity, gang membership, unemployment, employment in the 
informal economy, school underachievement and teenage child bearing.”229  
The community consequences or neighborhood effects include “higher crime 
rates, more observable public disorder and weaker institutional and political 
connections to the rest of the city than non-poor neighborhoods.”230  The 
exposure to concentrated disadvantage is now thought to lead to deleterious 
health, and even cognitive, effects by virtue of the impact from impoverished, 
 
224. Id.; SHARKEY, supra note 145, at 101, 114–15. 
225. SHARKEY, supra note 145, at 115. 
226. Id. at 115. 
227. See Myron Orfield, Choice, Equal Protection, and Metropolitan Integration: The Hope of 
the Minneapolis Desegregation Settlement, 24 L. & Ineq. 269, 281 (2006) (“As ‘fifty years 
of sociological data have made clear: being born into a poor family places students at risk, 
but to be assigned then to a school with a high concentration of poverty poses a second, 
independent disadvantage that poor children attending middle-class schools do not 
face.’”); David Dante Troutt, Trapped in Tragedies: Childhood Trauma, Spatial 
Inequality, and Law, 101 Marq. L. Rev. 601, 612 (2018) (“Children living in isolated, 
concentrated poverty are at highest risk for exposure to complex trauma.”). 
228. See George J. Borjas, Ethnic Capital and Intergenerational Mobility, 107 Q. J. ECON. 123, 
147 (1992) (demonstrating “[t]he skills and labor market outcomes of today's generation 
depend not only on the skills and labor market experiences of their parents, but also on 
the average skills and labor market experiences of the ethnic group in the parent's 
generation”). 
229. Tach, supra note 213, at 270. 
230. Id. 
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violence-prone, stigmatized neighborhoods.231  However, one cannot 
presume that this is always the case.  Concentration of poverty is isolating as 
people do not have access to job networks nor role models to embody 
examples of success, or provide educational or employment networks.  The 
possibilities for achievement and attainment are constrained or unavailable to 
residents, and in particular to children.  Thus, the popular lesson that seems 
to have been taken from study of the concentrated poverty phenomenon is an 
odd one.  Rather than help poor people to not be poor through perhaps 
income redistribution, the conclusion seems paradoxically to be that the best 
way to help poor people is by not having too many other poor people around.  
The mantra holds not that there should be fewer poor people in general, but 
that there should be a limit on entry of poor people into a residential area. 
Preventing the concentration of poverty would seem to be of benefit not 
just for the elites, who avoid the dysfunction as well as the race and class 
geographic stigmatization by the wider society.  But, the problems of the 
concentration of poverty are not fully understood as either cause or effect.  
Laura Tach points out, that there is no actual research examining these 
commonly held assumptions about neighborhood effects, which are in large 
part based on anecdotal observations.232  She questions, for example, whether 
people engaging in dysfunctional behavior are influenced to do so by these 
neighborhoods, or are simply drawn to them because they are inexpensive.233  
Thus, it is not clear what the chain of causation is or whether it is solely based 
on correlation. 
Mixed-income housing being understood as a way to avoid the 
concentration of poverty means that it embodies a form of discrimination 
management that works to the disadvantage of the poor by suggesting one 
cannot build affordable housing simply for people of low or modest income.  
It means that they have to wait for space to open up in mixed developments only.  
This plainly suggests that the mixed-income approach is not actually a policy to 
benefit poor people.  It means that the purpose of mixed income is a place-based 
policy, to ameliorate and prevent an area from being economically and racially 
identified as poor and Black.  In order to fit into the mainstream economy, to reap 
 
231. See Douglas Massey & Brandon Wagner, Segregation, Stigma, and Stratification: A 
Biosocial Model, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF STIGMA, DISCRIMINATION, AND HEALTH 
147, 164 (Brenda Major et al. eds., 2018). 
232. Laura M. Tach, The Stability of Mixed-Income Neighborhoods, ANNUAL MEETING AM. 
SOC. ASS’N 1, 2–4 (2009). 
233. Laura Marie Tach, BEYOND CONCENTRATED POVERTY: THE SOCIAL AND TEMPORAL 
DYNAMICS OF MIXED-INCOME NEIGHBORHOODS 1 (Apr. 22, 2010) (unpublished Ph.D 
dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author). 
Discrimination Management  1195 
the benefits of more affluent Whites being willing to live there, it is important to 
keep the low-income populations low.  Even if poor people have resources to spend, 
their resources are devalued socially; they are not the type of customer national 
businesses want to serve.234  This aspect of mixed-income housing as discrimination 
management means it responds to the reality that the society will not deal with the 
poor, therefore too many of them cannot be around.  By elevating a dispersal 
and concentration of poverty rationale, it obscures that concentration of 
poverty is, instead, a distinct geographical phenomenon.  It conflates effects 
with causes—the cause of concentration of poverty is everyone else—so those 
who have taken flight and disinvested are normalized and held not 
responsible. 
C. Managing the Tipping Point 
The quest to integrate requires not just accomplishing integration but 
maintaining it.  Though racism may be permanent, integration seems to 
promise less polarization and less inequality as it reduces separation.  As long 
as the Fair Housing Act has been pursuing integration, the potential fragility 
of that integration, because of the realities of race and class dynamics in 
neighborhoods, has been apparent.  Black people, freed by the Fair Housing 
Act, experienced White people begin to flee not long after they had moved 
into white neighborhoods.  History shows that some of this flight was 
manufactured by predatory blockbusting tactics that were used to inflame 
white fears, but the phenomenon had enough legs on its own absent those 
techniques to warrant judicial notice.235  Thus early Fair Housing 
jurisprudence was developed during this backdrop of white flight from cities, 
which was viewed as an inevitable, understandable phenomenon.236 
 
234. See e.g., Mary Jo Wiggins, Race, Class and Suburbia: The Modern Black Suburb as a ‘Race-
Making Situation,’ 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 749, 770–72 (2002) (discussing lack of 
retailers in affluent black communities around the United States). 
235. See United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1102 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting the 
existence of the “white flight” phenomenon and acknowledging that it may be considered 
as a factor in the integration equation); United States v. Charlottesville Redevelopment 
& Hous. Auth., 718 F. Supp. 461, 466 n.8 (W.D. Va. 1989); Jorman v. Veterans Admin., 
579 F. Supp. 1407 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (challenging the Veterans Administration of causing 
or contributing to white flight as a result of its home mortgage loan guaranty service). 
236. See Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d at 1102; see generally Peter H. Schuck, Judging 
Remedies: Judicial Approaches to Housing Segregation, 37 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES 
L. REV. 289, 297–99 (2002) (exploring efforts to maintain racial balance and the dynamics 
of white flight).  
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In acknowledging that the Fair Housing Act had the twin, and often 
conflicting, goals of antidiscrimination and integration, the courts generally 
upheld integration quotas as a necessary reality to maintain racially balanced 
communities.237  The next kind of integration problems arose in the context 
of federally sponsored housing projects, and the manner in which the 
obligation to advance fair housing and prevent segregation affected decisions 
about racial makeup of tenant populations.238  The quest to promote and 
achieve integration quickly ran into the problem of how to maintain that 
integration.  Often the articulated problem of maintaining integration was in 
reality a subterfuge or pretext for discrimination.239  In other scenarios, the 
Housing Authorities were genuinely seeking to maintain integration, 
attempted to do so through policies that came at the expense of the poor black 
tenants.240   
It also became apparent that the goal of integration, which was always 
under threat from white flight, was conceived from the perspective of white 
people.  In Otero, the New York Court of Appeals considered the local 
Housing Authority’s resolution of what it believed to  be a near irresolvable 
tension between guaranteed rights of return to redeveloped public housing 
and the reality that the tenants would be majority Black and thus constitute a 
racially segregated community.241  The District Court reasoned that the 
proper resolution was to prioritize the access to housing and to not deprive 
someone of access to low cost public housing because of their race.242 The 
court’s discussion about what constitutes integration is striking.  The plaintiffs 
asserted that “integration is achieved . . . when non-whites occupy 80% of a 
given project as well as when 80% of the project is white, particularly 
when . . . the Urban Renewal Area would probably be predominantly white 
overall and the Authority itself admits that the Lower East Side as a whole is 
 
237. See, e.g., Otero v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1132 (2d Cir. 1973). 
238. See Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d at 1100–01 (rejecting landlord’s “claim to be ‘clothed 
with governmental authority’ and thus obligated . . . to effectuate the purpose of the Fair 
Housing Act by affirmatively promoting integration and preventing ‘the reghettoization 
of a model integrated community’”). 
239. See Ankur J. Goel, Maintaining Integration Against Minority Interests: An Anti-Subjugation 
Theory for Equality in Housing, 22 URB. LAW. 369, 372–79 (1990). 
240. Id. 
241. Otero, 484 F.2d at 1124 (“[T]he effect of adherence to its regulation would be to create a non-
white ‘pocket ghetto’ that would operate as a racial ‘tipping factor’ causing white residents to take 
flight and leading eventually to non-white ghettoization of the community.”). 
242. Id. at 1125 (“[A]lthough the Authority was under a constitutional and statutory duty to foster 
and maintain racial integration, this duty could not . . . be given effect where to do so would be 
to deprive a non-white minority of low cost public housing that would otherwise be assigned to 
it . . . .”). 
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48% white.”243  The Court effectively rejected this definition and instead 
accepted the Housing Authority’s assertion that its duty to maintain 
integration as equal to preventing concentrations of nonwhite residents that 
would be off-putting to white residents.244  Thus, maintaining integration was 
defined as policing the location of minorities so as to not offend white 
sensibilities about desirable concentrations.245  The Housing Authority argued 
that: 
[L]arge concentrations of non-whites in one or more pockets within 
the community would act as a “tipping” factor which would 
precipitate an increase in the non-white population in the 
surrounding neighborhoods, leading to a steady loss of total white 
population over a given period of time.  [The Housing Authority] 
argues that it is under an obligation to prevent the formation of such 
concentrations or pockets of non-whites[.]246 
Otero’s rationale seems, today, strikingly paternalistic and misdirected in 
emphasis.  It views integration solely from the standpoint of the dissimilarity 
index rather than understanding it to also be about the right to exercise a 
choice.  That choice was denied on the basis of race.  The Court in Otero used 
past decisions about segregatory decisions that either barred nonwhite 
individuals from residing in white areas or relegated nonwhites to already 
nonwhite areas.247  What the Court missed was that those decisions prevented 
the freedom to choose to move.  The decision about the choice to return or 
stay was an entirely different issue—must the Housing Authority prevent a 
poor nonwhite person from exercising that autonomy where it would 
arguably result in concentrations of nonwhite people?  The Otero court 
answered yes.248 
 
243. Id. at 1132. 
244. Id. at 1134. 
245. See S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Mount Laurel Tp., 92 N.J. 158 (1983). 
246. Otero, 484 F.2d. at 1133. 
247. Id. at 1133 (citing Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ill. 1969), 
aff’d 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970)). 
248. See also Burney v. Hous. Auth. of Beaver Cty., 551 F. Supp. 746, 749 (W.D. Pa. 1982) 
(“[A] formal complaint against the Housing Authority charging that the Housing 
Authority had violated, and was continuing to violate . . . Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Act . . . by maintaining housing projects that were segregated by the race of the 
tenant. . . . [A] Consent Order was designed to desegregate the Housing Authority’s low 
income housing projects . . . through the use of a new tenant selection and assignment 
procedure.  [It creates] a target racial balance for each of the Housing Authority’s family 
projects [and uses] an applicant’s race as a preferential determinant in order to reach and 
maintain that target balance.”).  The question raised by the Housing Authority’s use of 
its integration maintenance plan, therefore, is whether an individual black may be made 
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As early as the early 1970s, commentators noted that “[d]evelopers 
anxious to avoid ‘tipping’ a project from white to black appear to set low 
minority marketing goals.”249  In 1988, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit in U.S. v. Starrett City Associates crystallized who bore the 
brunt of the cap: 
The consequence of Starrett’s policy of maintaining racial balance 
has been that Black applicants constitute a disproportionately larger 
share [54%] of the waiting list for apartments than do Whites [22%], 
and remain on the list for considerably longer periods of time than 
do Whites . . .  For a two-bedroom apartment, the average waiting 
time on the list for qualified applicants was twenty months for 
Blacks and two months for Whites; for a one-bedroom apartment, 
the comparable figures were eleven months and four months.250 
The most objectionable aspect of Starrett City’s integration maintenance 
quotas was not the “use of race” as a criteria per se, but the disparate impact 
of the use of race.251 
 
to suffer exclusion in an effort to prevent resegregation of the system.  Id. at 758.  “There 
is a limited usefulness in generalizing from tipping point experiences in a neighborhood, 
where whites are free to buy and sell homes as they please, to low-income housing, where 
demand exceeds supply and whites who are in need of housing may simply have to 
suppress their intolerance for blacks in order to receive much needed housing.  This 
suggests that the tipping point is probably considerably higher in low-income housing 
projects than in residential neighborhoods.”  Id. at 767. 
249. Bruce L. Ackerman, Integration for Subsidized Housing and the Question of Racial 
Occupancy Controls, 26 STAN. L. REV. 245 (1974); Eleanor P. Wolf, The Tipping-Point in 
Racially Changing Neighborhoods, 29 J. AM. INST. PLAN. 3 (1963); John M. Goering, 
Neighborhood Tipping and Racial Transition: A Review of Social Science Evidence, 44 J. 
AM. INST. PLAN. 1 (1978); David Card et al., Tipping and the Dynamics of Segregation, 123 
Q. J. ECON. 177 (2008); Thomas C. Schelling, The Process of Residential Segregation: 
Neighborhood Tipping, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 157 (Anthony H. 
Pascal ed., 1972); see Timothy R. Graham, The Benign Housing Quota: A Legitimate 
Weapon to Fight White Flight and Resulting Segregated Communities?, 42 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 891 (1974); Benign Steering and Benign Quotas: The Validity of Race-Conscious 
Government Policies to Promote Residential Integration, 93 HARV. L. REV. 938 (1980); 
Tipping the Scales of Justice: A Race-Conscious Remedy for Neighborhood Transition, 90 
YALE L.J. 377 (1980).  
250. See Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d at 1104. 
251. Id. at 1099.   
[A]partment opportunities for blacks and hispanics were far fewer “than 
would be expected if race and national origin were not taken into account, 
while opportunities for whites were substantially greater than what their 
application rates projected.  Minority applicants waited up to ten times 
longer than the average white applicant before they were offered an 
apartment.  Starrett City’s active file was 21.9% white in October 1985, but 
whites occupied 64.7% of the apartments in January 1984.  Although the 
file was 53.7% black and 18% hispanic in October 1985, blacks and 
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Starrett’s allocation of public housing facilities on the basis of racial 
quotas, by denying an applicant access to a unit otherwise available solely 
because of race, produces a “discriminatory effect . . . [that] could hardly be 
clearer.”252 Such quotas do not provide minorities with access to Starrett City, 
but rather, act as a ceiling to their access.  Thus, the impact of appellants’ 
practices falls squarely on minorities, for whom Title VIII was intended to 
create housing opportunities.253 
Quantitatively, the program used white fears and behaviors  as the 
fulcrum of the policy and to the detriment of the black and Latino people who 
bore the brunt of those fears.254  But the majority opinion concluded that only 
colorblind criteria would pass muster without acknowledging that income 
could be used as a proxy to accomplish the same thing.255  The goal of 
maintaining integration at the expense of the supposed benefitted population 
is highly problematic because it takes two things away—access to housing and 
the right to choose where to live.  The norms of mixing and integration have to 
include that element of choice for the lower-income person.256 
Inclusionary zoning incorporates the tipping rationale in the statutorily 
defined inclusionary percentages.257  When perceived as a floor, the percentages 
seem quite progressive as they ensure access where there otherwise would not 
have been any.  But they can also be a de facto ceiling, because no for-profit 
developer is likely to exceed those percentages.  Thus, inclusionary zoning 
ordinances have established a statutorily controlling tipping percentage.  This 
 
hispanics, respectively, occupied only 20.8% and 7.9% of the apartments as 
of January 1984.”  
Id. (citing United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 660 F. Supp. 668, 672, 676 (E.D. N.Y. 
1987)) (citations omitted).  
252. Id. at 1100. 
253. Id. at 1102. 
254. Id. at 1104.   
255. Id. at 1102. 
256. See John O. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1067, 1073 (1998); Calmore, supra note 154, at 1507. 
257. See URBAN INST., supra note 36, at 88 (surveying thirteen locations nationwide and 
concluding that “[t]he percentage of affordable units to be side aside [under inclusionary 
zoning ordinances] ranges from 4 to 30.  The average in the 13 jurisdictions is 13 
percent.”).  But see Lawrence J. Vale & Shomon Shamsuddin, All Mixed Up: Making Sense 
of Mixed-Income Housing Developments, 83 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N (2017) (establishing a 
framework for assessing Hope VI mixed-income developments: (1) allocation—the 
proportion and range of incomes included in projects; (2) proximity—the spatial scale at 
which income mixing is intended; (3) tenure—the balance between rental housing and 
homeownership units; and (4) duration—the amount of time projects remain mixed-
income based on funding restrictions).  Robert Ellickson argues that mixed income 
housing should be located by the block or neighborhood rather than building by building 
may, in theory, be acceptable and just as beneficial. Ellickson, supra note 9, at 1016. 
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percentage is particularly attenuated when applied to an individual 
development.  This tipping rationale shows mixed-income housing to be a 
particular kind of integration maintenance technique that maintains white, 
affluent dominance. 
This resurrects something reminiscent of the Starrett City integration 
maintenance policy, which was invalidated because it was explicitly 
predicated on race.  Inclusionary zoning similarly presents the question of 
who bears the brunt of inclusionary housing minimum unit quotas.  They are 
a cap.  They also disparately impact the poor and minority by defining their 
presence in the community for reasons of social control, sensibilities, and 
market rate residents’ preferences, rather than purely because of the financial 
reasons typically offered.  The financial reasons could in fact be tied into the 
discriminatory inclinations, the class aversions, and the class cultural 
preferences of the middle class. 
Thus, the tipping point rationale is quietly embodied in mixed income 
set aside percentages.  Such percentages are understood as being related only 
to the economic feasibility of the deal, but the reality is that social assumptions 
and meanings are part of the definition.  People are not aware nor focused on 
the design as reflecting prejudice.  “Concentrated poverty” is now used as a 
causal factor rather than a descriptor of disinvestment.  It is also code for 
class-based discrimination. 
Drawing again from social domination theory, the appeal of statutory 
tipping rationale means mixed-income housing is structured in a way to allow 
the upper and middle classes to dominate the lower class.  There are definitely 
class distinctions present in daily life, and these distinctions are particularly 
important to social hierarchy.258  This illustrates that the need for social 
domination, which shaped the persistence of racial residential segregation 
through various iterations, also presents itself within the racial hierarchy 
underlying the tipping rationale. 
D. Managing Through Modeling and Social Control—The Myth  
of the Benevolent Middle Class259 
The ways in which mixed-income housing fulfills the need for social 
domination leads to its next limitation—mixed-income housing is supposed to 
 
258. NILSON ARIEL ESPINO, BUILDING THE INCLUSIVE CITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE FOR 
CONFRONTING URBAN SEGREGATION (2015). 
259. August, supra note 50, at 3405–06 (noting the “myth of the benevolent middle class” and 
that “[s]upporters of redevelopment tend to draw on a common set of ideas and theories 
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provide opportunities to mix and learn from role models.260  Mixed-income 
housing is justified as being beneficial for lower-income individuals personally.  
By socially mixing, the poor learn to aspire to something more than 
unemployment and impoverishment.  They see people with higher education 
such as the doctor and the lawyer, and learn about the possibilities for 
personal accomplishment and economic mobility.  Moreover, these 
associational, role modeling opportunities are touted as societally beneficial 
by providing social control benefits. 
Mixed income’s cross-class integration fails to grapple with 1) how class 
homogeneity is valued, 2) how status and dominance are determined by class 
and race, and 3) how mixed-income housing flies in the face of this.  The social 
science literature answers the questions that the legal literature does not: 1) 
does cross-class interaction among residents of mixed-income developments 
take place meaningfully across income lines and 2) is this interaction 
beneficial to low-income residents in terms of “access to employment, 
information about schools, services, or other resources?”261  The answer to 
these types of questions has been a resounding “no.”262  Residents tend to 
interact with one another within a development “based on perceived 
characteristics in common.”263  Consequently, this purported benefit does not 
exist, though it reflects romanticized assumptions in our public discourse 
about the benefits of integrated communities from the past. 
Some researchers have advocated for the role model theory for children 
in these communities—children benefit from exposure to adults engaging in 
different career paths and lifestyles.264  Yet, the literature has shown that the 
 
to support and justify redevelopment, including neo-traditional design ideals, academic 
‘deconcentration’ theory and planning wisdom favouring ‘social mix’”). 
260. Mark L. Joseph, Robert J. Chaskin & Henry S. Webber, The Theoretical Basis for 
Addressing Poverty Through Mixed-Income Development, 42 URB. AFF. REV. 369 (2007). 
261. Diane K. Levy, Zach McDade & Kassie Bertumen, Mixed-Income Living: Anticipated and 
Realized Benefits for Low-Income Households, 15 CITYSCAPE 15, 18 (2013) (“Compared 
with the hypothesized benefits, the actual benefits from living in mixed-income 
developments or income-diverse areas have been limited for low-income households.  In 
particular, investments have brought about environmental improvements to housing 
and neighborhoods, but benefits tied to economic desegregation and poverty alleviation 
have not been realized.”). 
262. James C. Fraser, Robert J. Chaskin & Joshua Theodore Bazuin, Making Mixed-Income 
Neighborhoods Work for Low-Income Households, 15 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & 
RESEARCH 83, 89 (2013). 
263. Id. at 90.  See also Glynn, supra note 72, at 78–80 (citing numerous studies from the U.K. 
that conclude social mixing does not occur). 
264. Joseph, Chaskin & Webber, supra note 260, at 391.  See generally Raj Chetty, Nathaniel 
Hendren & Lawrence F. Katz, The Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on 
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role model and social networks experience does not work  as theorized.265  
According to the social science literature, the research has shown that mixed-
income living has not galvanized people to enter the workforce and end 
poverty, or broken down social barriers as expected.266  The residents of 
mixed-income communities are often merely adults who likely are past the 
role model stage or able to seek out role models on their own. 
The other prominent expectation of mixed-income housing is its explicit 
vision of social mixing.  The social science literature shows, however, that this 
social mixing is affected deeply by race and class expectations, and does not 
seem to occur in any meaningful or beneficial way.267 Mark Joseph and Robert 
Chaskin extensively document the uneasy relationship between former public 
housing residents and market rate tenants who isolate and ostracize the lower-
income residents.268  In particular, the lower-income residents are not able to 
represent their interests adequately in tenant meetings and experience 
excessive policing for their “non-middle class behaviors.”269  Examples of the 
bases of conflicts between working class black residents and affluent white 
residents include barbecuing, congregating, Sunday parking for church, and 
drumming in Harlem.270  Fraser writes: 
Indeed, subsidized renters in mixed-income developments are 
often the objects of intensified surveillance and discipline, in part 
because site management is charged with drawing middle-income 
 
Children: New Evidence From the Moving to Opportunity Experiment, 106 AM. ECON. 
REV. 855 (2016). 
265. ROBERT J. CHASKIN & MARK L. JOSEPH, INTEGRATING THE INNER CITY: THE PROMISE AND 
PERILS OF MIXED-INCOME PUBLIC HOUSING TRANSFORMATION (2015). 
266. Indeed, Fraser et al. point out that many public housing residents who survived Hope VI 
and are now working still qualify for public housing, which suggests the problem is 
structural rather than due to a lack of role models.  See Fraser, Chaskin & Bazuin, supra 
note 262, at 95. 
267. Robert J. Chaskin & Mark L. Joseph, Social Interaction in Mixed-Income Developments: 
Relational Expectations and Emerging Reality, 33 J. URB. AFF. 209 (2011). 
268. Id. 
269. Id. 
270. See Chaskin & Joseph, supra note 267 (describing conflicts over public gatherings and 
barbecuing at picnic tables instead of in backyards); Robert McCartney, ‘Black 
Nranding’—How a D.C. Neighborhood Was Marketed to White Millennials, WASH. POST, 
(May 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/black-branding--how-a-dc-
neighborhood-was-marketed-to-white-millenials/2017/05/02/68b0ae06-2f47-11e7-
9534-00e4656c22aa_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.e9e78617d47a 
[https://perma.cc/X7XY-A6RV] (“[L]obbying by new arrivals cost black churchgoers a 
long-standing convenience of parking in a school playground on Sunday mornings.  
Small, black-owned businesses that served as public gathering places have shut their 
doors.”); Timothy Williams, An Old Sound in Harlem Draws New Neighbors’ Ire, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 6, 2008 (police called over Harlem tradition of Saturday evening drumming).  
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residents into these developments to capture enough ground rent 
to offset the costs associated with a devolved public housing 
program.271 
Thus, physical integration does not only fail as a socially integrative 
measure, but actually increases surveillance and control of low-income people. 
As a result, marginalization, both inter- and intraracial, is prevalent in 
mixed-income developments.  The intraracial marginalization is significant 
because this whole endeavor has been based on William Julius Wilson’s 
observation that the inner city poor were being deprived of interaction with 
higher classes of black people, and they would benefit from such exposure.272  
Chaskin and Joseph observe that “[s]everal theoretical propositions that lie 
behind this policy are based on assumptions about the ways in which living 
among higher-income residents can lead to relationships and interactions 
that may benefit poor people.”273  The combination of how difficult it is to 
foster these interactions (as numerous authors have shown) and of the reality 
that the number of poor have to be kept to a minimum lead the poor bear the 
cost of that policy goal as a result.  Accordingly, Khare, Joseph and Chaskin 
tellingly observe: 
The emerging prevalence of secondary marginalization in these 
new mixed-income contexts is particularly important given that the 
policy was in part based on the work of scholars such as Wilson 
(2012) who contended that the Black middle class could play a 
positive role as role models by returning to inner city 
communities.274 
This observation gets to the heart of the contradiction, and again raises 
the questions that forcing an economic mix might 1) not be necessary and 2) 
be done at the expense of the poor people in the community who are deprived 
of the opportunity for valid status and legitimacy within their own peer 
group.275  There is a back and forth between opacity and transparency in 
 
271. See Fraser, Chaskin & Bazuin, supra note 262, at 90 (discussing the fact that in many 
cases, young black men are identified as a threat when they “convene and converse in 
public space”). 
272. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 56 (1st ed. 1987).  
273. Chaskin & Joseph, supra note 267, at 269.  
274. Amy T. Khare, Mark L. Joseph & Robert J. Chaskin, The Enduring Significance of Race in 
Mixed-Income Developments, 51 URB. AFF. REV. 474, 480 (2015). 
275. See Kelly D. Owens, The Social Construction of a Public/Private Neighborhood: Examining 
Neighbor Interaction and Neighborhood Meaning in a New Orleans Mixed-Income 
Development, 1473 U. NEW ORLEANS THESES & DISSERTATIONS 1, 10 (2012) (noting that most 
residents were trying to get out of the mixed-income community).  “Market-rate 
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mixed-income housing schemes.  They call for transparency in having the 
poor see how the well-off live but they also call for opacity by obscuring, as 
much as possible, that the poor are present in the formerly exclusive enclaves 
of the affluent. 
E. Managing Class Without Addressing Race—Microsegregation  
and the Integration Paradox 
Further problematic in the assumptions of mixing and cross-class 
contact in mixed-income developments, is that research seems to indicate that 
significant microsegregation, rather than integration, takes place in mixed-
income communities.276  While mixed-income housing is appealingly and 
expediently framed in race-neutral, market-based terms that emphasize price 
point and housing tenure, the focus on income fails to acknowledge the racial 
dynamics within mixed-income communities.  Studies indicate that 
microsegregation takes place when there are visible markers of status 
differences, such as race, use of public housing, and tenure.277  More cross-
class contact takes place when there is homogeneity of status.278  In other 
words, when class tracks race, assumptions, stigmatization, and segregation 
result.  Thus, instead of integration and inclusion, mixed-income housing 
schemes promise to render the poor socially isolated because they ignore the 
potential for microsegregation.  This deprives the low-income resident of 
status and a voice in their own community.279 
 
residents were uncomfortable with the environment but constrained by rental leases; 
public housing residents were being marginalized but did not have other housing 
options; and homeowners, who were anxious about their investment in a neighborhood 
that was still in the early stages of change, were confined by negative equity.”  Id.  Some 
resident who had moved in with different expectations decided to accept the 
neighborhood, had positive perceptions and were engaged.  Id.  These tended to be the 
public housing and Section 8 residents mostly.  Id. 
276. See CHASKIN & JOSEPH, supra note 265.  Chaskin and Joseph’s research shows that 
microsegregation is an enduring feature of a significant number of mixed-income 
housing developments; racial privilege and stigma plays a significant role in broadcasting 
the presence of differences in status within mixed-income communities and defines 
reactions of acceptance or exclusion.  Id.   
277. Laura Tach, Diversity, Inequality, and Microsegregation: Dynamics of Inclusion and 
Exclusion in a Racially and Economically Diverse Community, 16 CITYSCAPE 13, 24, 26 
(2014).  Tach studied residents’ perceptions of their economically and racially diverse 
neighborhood showed race- and class-based patterns of inclusion and exclusion in daily 
routines, particularly in sublocal organizations, suggesting that neighborhood integration may 
solve some problems of social exclusion while creating new problems of microsegregation.  Id. 
278. Tach, supra note 223, at 22. 
279. Stereotypes about poor people are often silently connected to black spatial isolation leading not 
only opposition to low-income housing, but opposition to the people themselves. See Laura 
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Therefore, mixed-income schemes may work better in racially 
homogeneous settings.  This reflects how property markets react to the 
presence of the socially stigmatized.  Kushner observes that a study by Robert 
Putnam shows greater racial and ethnic diversity makes white people 
withdraw.280  According to J. Eric Oliver, this is because integration presents 
a paradox of diversity and of community.281  Integration has been found to 
bring greater cross-racial understanding, accompanied by more alienation.  
First, racial hostility increases if there are greater numbers of racial minorities 
at the metropolitan level—the paradox of diversity.  Correspondingly, more 
segregated neighborhoods correlate with more racial hostility.  Yet, living 
among people of different races in integrated neighborhoods is correlated 
with less racial resentment, because there is more meaningful interracial 
contact.282,283 People in integrated neighborhoods “have more interracial 
social ties, participate in more interracial civic associations and work in more 
integrated jobs” and are less likely to have racial hostility.”284  Notwithstanding 
this positive effect from neighborhood integration, there is also a paradoxical 
effect of community involvement decreasing.285  For members of racial 
minorities, being “in a more integrated neighborhood means being less 
socially connected in general and more alienated from one’s neighbors in 
particular . . .  For Americans, same-race neighborhoods provide a feeling of 
 
Sullivan, Section 8 Vouchers Help the Poor—But Only If Housing is Available, NPR (May 10, 2017, 
4:35 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/10/527660512 /section-8-vouchers-help-the-poor-but-
only-if-housing-is-available [https://perma.cc/7DPE-GM56].  In comparison, white Section 8 
holders live in the lowest poverty neighborhoods.  See Nat’l Low Income Hous. Coalition, Who 
Lives in Federally Assisted Housing?, 2 HOUSING SPOTLIGHT 4 (Nov. 2012), 
http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files /HousingSpotlight2-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/WP7W-BRH4]. 
280. For a similar point, see James A. Kushner, Urban Neighborhood Regeneration and the 
Phases of Community Evolution After World War II in the United States, 41 IND. L. REV. 
575, 599–601 (2008) (citing Michael Jonas, The Downside of Diversity: A Harvard 
Political Scientist Finds That Diversity Hurts Civic Life.  What Happens When a Liberal 
Scholar Unearths an Inconvenient Truth?, BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 5, 2007), 
http://archive.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2007/08/05/the_downside_of_dive
rsity [https://perma.cc/ZY37-HK84] (noting a “diversity paradox” -- due to continued 
racial hostility withdrawal from civic life is correlated with neighborhood diversity.  The 
more ethnically and racially diverse, the lower social capital and the higher distrust 
among neighbors . . . . [Thus] a dispersed population does not necessarily generate an 
assimilated, socially cohesive society.”). 
281. J. ERIC OLIVER, THE PARADOXES OF INTEGRATION: RACE, NEIGHBORHOOD, AND CIVIC LIFE 
IN MULTIETHNIC AMERICA 5–6 (2010). 
282. Id. 
283. Id. 
284. Id. at 7. 
285. Id. at 8. 
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community not available in a larger, diverse society.”286  Oliver argues that we 
must pay attention to the costs of integration, which he points out are most 
heavily borne by dark-skinned minorities.287  Oliver explains that there is an 
unresolved tension between assimilative processes that “sustain social 
cohesion” across the society, and those that maintain “cultural differences.”288  
Oliver posits that “the real transformation in American racial attitudes 
requires the elimination of ethnic, cultural and social markers that many 
groups hold as a fundamental part of their identity and . . . this will do so at 
the expense of darker-skinned people.”289  For example, Oliver notes that 
many argue that Asian and Latino people should seek to transcend racial 
barriers by becoming White, at the expense of Blacks.290  As a result, Oliver 
concludes that the increasing racial diversity in the US will lead to greater 
racial hostility and competition.291 
Echoed by Laura Tach’s earlier work and by Chaskin and Joseph, Oliver’s 
most critical finding for the mixed-income community is that equality or 
similarity in income status is very important for racial understanding in 
integrated communities: 
According to social psychologists and social capital theorists, 
interracial proximity is not sufficient for reducing racial hostility; 
rather, if people are to overcome their racial animosities toward 
 
286. Id. 
287. Id. at 8.  For a similar point see Calmore, supra note 154, at 1504–06 (“It is rare for blacks 
and whites to experience both integrated housing and a sense of community.  Blacks 
demonstrate a history of integrating for a better housing package, not in quest of 
community.  Integrated housing seldom represents ‘a path to belonging.’ It is usually at 
the expense of community that blacks improve their housing package in integrated 
settings dominated by whites.  The integration imperative is predicated on white 
dominance and virtual assimilation by blacks as preconditions to whites accepting blacks 
into their communities. . . .  In light of the difficulty of linking home and community in 
the context of residential integration, there is evidence that even middle-class blacks 
increasingly value black community attachment and affiliation at the expense of 
integration.”  Accordingly, “the black middle class . . . has [managed] to attain the 
benefits of socio-economic mobility without living in integrated neighborhoods.”).  But 
see Sharkey, supra note 145, at 903–54 (“Although all groups of African-Americans 
continue to live in areas with greater levels of neighborhood disadvantage and spatial 
disadvantage than other racial/ethnic groups, middle- and upper-income African-
Americans increasingly live in communities that are spatially separated from highly 
disadvantaged neighborhoods.  These changes are driven primarily by growth in the 
proportion of middle- and upper-income African-Americans who live outside of central 
cities and outside of majority-black neighborhoods.”). 
288. OLIVER, supra note 281, at 8. 
289. Id. 
290. Id. 
291. Id. at 8. 
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other groups, they must do so through contact in very specific 
circumstances (that is, all parties must be of equal status and work 
together toward a shared goal.)  In short, people in integrated 
neighborhoods need to have structured interactions with other 
races, whether . . . in a work setting or within a local civic 
organization, to overcome their racial animosities.292 
Oliver’s insights are echoed by other researchers’ work on the dynamics 
of mixed-income neighborhoods.  Skoba and Goetz question “housing 
policies [emphasizing mobility] that, although seeking to improve the 
conditions for very low-income families, disrupt vital social support systems 
that help families meet basic needs.”293  According to Tach, the evidence 
suggests that mixed-income approaches at the neighborhood level have 
“modest ability to integrate the poor with near-poor or moderate-income 
households, but these efforts prove difficult to sustain over time because of 
the forces of residential mobility and neighborhood change.”294  Tach also 
notes that “few project-based or voucher-based efforts have succeeded in 
integrating lower-income residents into affluent neighborhoods.”295  
However, her case study of Chester Square in the South End of Boston 
suggests a model of how “project-based subsidies can be used when there are 
motivated neighborhood actors who mobilize to preserve affordability in the 
face of rising property values.”296  Nonprofit organizations mobilized early, at 
the first sign of gentrification, to create affordable housing options that 
seemed to fit well within the existing neighborhood.297 
Mixed-income housing faces a very real challenge, as it seeks to integrate 
by income, race plays a determining role in whether such communities 
succeed.  Cross-class interactions that also are cross-race interactions are 
likely difficult, in part, because it is difficult to experience how much wealth 
or how little someone has relative to another person.  Experiencing that 
 
292. Id. at 7. 
293. Kimberly Skobba & Edward G. Goetz, Mobility Decisions of Very-Low Income 
Households, 15 CITYSCAPE 188, 188 (2013) (questioning assumptions that very low-
income households’ housing outcomes are the result of considered choices and 
demonstrating instead that relationships, rather than neighborhoods are the driving 
factor in residential decisionmaking). 
294. Laura Tach et al., Income Mixing Across the Scales: Rationale, Trends, Policies, Practice, 
and Research for More Inclusive Neighborhoods and Metropolitan Areas, URBAN INST. 43, 
43 (Jan. 2014), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/22226/412998-
Income-Mixing-across-Scales-Rationale-Trends-Policies-Practice-and-Research-for-More-
Inclusive-Neighborhoods-and-Metropolitan-Areas.PDF [https://perma.cc/UL7L-VJJX].  
295. Id.  
296. Id. 
297. Id. at 41–42. 
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difference across race violates racialized class expectations.298  At the very 
least, it seems that managing discrimination in mixed-income policy may 
require focusing on structuring mixed-income housing to take into account 
proximity of income and status:299 
[F]or mixing to have a role in making our cities more just, the 
people being mixed need to be in proximity on their own terms and 
those terms need some level of equivalence or 
comparability. . .  Thus, the broad consensus among those who 
have studied social networks in Hope VI developments is that 
improving the life opportunities of low-income residents cannot 
hinge on social mixing.300 
At the very least, more social science research is needed on the impact of 
different aspects of mixed-income housing and resident interaction—the 
effects of different income and tenure mixes, whether certain resident 
governance structures are more beneficial than others, the extent and 
durability of improved educational outcomes for children, and the impact of 
the actual development’s design configuration on resident interaction.301 
Perhaps such research might be guided by social contact theory, which 
is frequently explored in other fields such as diversity in college admissions, 
and which presumes that pursuing diversity in admissions requires paying 
attention to and delineating distinct cohorts of students who are close to each 
other in class status and experience.  Social contact theory’s underlying 
assumption is that equal status is one of the preconditions of flourishing in a 
 
298. See OFFICE POLICY DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., Mixed-Income 
Community Dynamics: Five Insights From Ethnography, EVIDENCE MATTERS (Spring 2013), 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/em/spring13/highlight2.html 
[https://perma.cc/N8LK-RYQ5].  See also Amie Thurber, Claire Riehle Bohmann & Craig 
Anne Heflinger, Spatially Integrated and Socially Segregated: The Effects of Mixed-Income 
Neighbourhoods on Social Well-Being, 55 URB. STUD. 1859, 1870–71 (2017) (“Spatial integration 
requires proactive investment in preserving existing positive social networks, while at the same 
time promoting social integration among residents of different backgrounds.”). 
299. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 9, at 1010 (“[S]ociological theory suggests that members 
of lower-income households themselves might dislike the social environment of an 
inclusionary development.  Individuals tend to care a lot about their relative status in a 
given social setting.”). 
300. Fraser, Chaskin, & Bazuin, supra note 262, at 90. 
301. DIANE K. LEVY, ZACH MCDADE & KASSIE DUMLAO, URBAN INST., EFFECTS FROM LIVING IN MIXED-
INCOME COMMUNITIES FOR LOW-INCOME FAMILIES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 4–5, 14 (2010) 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/27116/412292-Effects-from-Living-in-
Mixed-Income-Communities-for-Low-Income-Families.PDF [https://perma.cc/HY3J-6FJE] 
(conducting a literature review of mixed-income housing strategies confirming some benefits 
but concluding such strategies are insufficient for overcoming social barriers and alleviating 
poverty). 
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diverse environment, and the foundation for acceptance and tolerance.  
Similarly, mixed-income housing’s already imperfect endeavor may require 
attention to structuring mixes of residents in terms of cohorts of status.302  
This of course begs the question about whether the goal of mixing may truly 
be fulfilled.  The poor door controversy in NYC was at least caused by mixing 
hyper luxury and moderate income and involved a wide a gap in economic 
and social status.  Lack of mixing, aversion, and disdain were built into the 
building’s design on a number of levels.  In a society that does not explicitly 
acknowledge class divisions, specifically racialized class divisions, designing 
cohorts in mixed-income housing will be a problematic endeavor that will 
vary based on context.  In certain circumstances, the elite can be so 
comfortable with their self-perceptions of their own status that the poor do 
not threaten their status identity.  For example, elite academics may achieve 
their status through educational accomplishments, and tend to have 
comparatively less need to obtain status through consumption of material 
goods, like one’s home for someone who is middle or lower middle class. 
F. Managing Without Addressing Gentrification  
and the Concentration of Affluence303 
Mixed-income housing is viewed as an antidote to gentrification, yet it 
is not fully acknowledged that in very tight housing markets, it can be used to 
gentrify existing low-income neighborhoods under the guise of doing fair and 
equitable mixed-income development.304  By definition, the predominant 
housing unit type available in mixed-income housing are not affordable units 
 
302. See Peter Arcidiacono et al., A Conversation on the Nature, Effects, and Future of 
Affirmative Action in Higher Education Admissions, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 683, 698, 703–
07 (2015) (debating the causes and effects of social mismatch theory in the context of 
affirmative action; is there too great a social distance between underrepresented 
minorities and whites that are detrimental to performance, or does diversity enhance 
perspective and shared values among students who are racially/ethnically different). 
303. See Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, Concentrated 
Affluence and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 17–21 (2006) 
(arguing that concentrated affluence should be the focus, not just concentrated poverty 
because concentrated affluence magnifies the impact of racism in the psychology of the 
real estate market); Douglas S. Massey, The Age of Extremes: Concentrated Affluence and 
Poverty in the Twenty-First Century, 33 DEMOGRAPHY 395, 399, 407 (1996) (predicting 
the divergence and distance between the social worlds of the rich and poor in twenty-
first century caused by “geographic concentration of affluence and poverty”). 
304. See DEREK S. HYRA, RACE, CLASS, AND POLITICS IN THE CAPPUCCINO CITY (2017) 
(describing the complex interplay of gentrification in mixed race, mixed income 
communities in Washington DC);  Glynn, supra note 72, at 64.  
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but rather market rate units.305  They can be used in existing low-income 
communities to provide more units for the affluent with only a set aside for 
lower-income residents. 
Accordingly, Robert Chaskin observes: 
[T]he narrative arc of public housing policy enactment and reform 
is not merely a story about housing the poor, but more broadly 
about the appropriation and reappropriation of urban space in 
succeeding efforts to reenvision, reclaim, and remake parts of the 
city that have become “discredited” by poverty, crime, and physical 
decay and to build in their place new, wholesome, reimagined 
communities.  In pursuing these broader goals of urban renewal, 
public housing policies in different phases both reflect a set of moral 
judgments about the poor and are framed by a set of moral claims 
that justify the need for demolition, relocation, development, and 
resettlement.  Within this process, residents moved out to make way 
for redevelopment constitute a small minority of those who move 
back.306 
Thus, the most underdeveloped aspect of mixed-income housing theory 
may be its emphasis on problematizing the concentration of poverty without 
similarly problematizing the concentration of affluence, of which it is also a 
manifestation.  What conclusions would we reach if we fully acknowledged 
that the primary force behind income segregation is concentration of 
affluence?  According to Tach, the rise in racially segregated, high poverty 
neighborhoods is partly a function of increasing income inequality and a 
concomitant growth in economic segregation.307  It turns out, however, “the 
rich are considerably more segregated from the non-rich than the poor are from 
the non-poor.”308  Tach argues that the segregation of affluence is a greater concern 
because the it expanded at the same time that segregation of poverty grew.309  
Beyond reducing the odds of cross-class contact, the segregation of the affluent 
may reduce their support for investments that benefit cities or support 
regional integration.  It also may reduce the chances that less-affluent 
 
305. See URBAN INST., supra note 36, at 4 (describing the percentage of units in market rate 
developments in Montgomery County, Maryland and Fairfax County, Virginia as ranging from 
a mere 6.25 percent to 15 percent). 
306. Robert J. Chaskin, Book Review, 119 AM. J. SOC. 1788 (2014) (reviewing VALE, supra note 126).   
307. TACH, PENDALL & DERIAN, supra note 218, at 12–13. 
308. Id. at 12. 
309. Id. at 12–13. 
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residents will benefit from the positive spillovers of public goods in affluent 
areas, like schools.310 
In addition, sociological theory suggests that members of lower-income 
households themselves might dislike the social environment of an 
inclusionary development.  Individuals tend to care a lot about their relative 
status in a given social setting.311  In particular, Ellickson’s critique gets to the 
heart of the class tension within mixed-income housing but overlooks a subtle 
but important point.  Implicit in his critique is the right to places that are 
exclusive to high-income people.312  While this is certainly an accepted reality 
in today’s society, articulating its basis is difficult, if not problematic.  He 
considers that lower-income people might share the preference, but states that 
their preferences are not solicited.  Thus, the preference of the affluent will 
likely prevail.  As John Calmore observed, integration decision-making 
involves a process of tradeoffs in access to goods like safe neighborhoods, 
schools, and other positional and status goods, but this access comes with 
personal costs.313  Thus, the decision not to integrate may stem from seeking 
protection from discrimination, rather than merely aversion.  This protective 
choice reflects other choices that have been made for you.  As a result, the real 
question may not be a particular decision to self-segregate, but instead to 
ensure that there are options.  The choices exercised by the wealthy and the 
poor will not be the same. 
The problem is not really that the mixed-income model is based on 
somewhat misconceived or unproven ideals.  Instead, the problem is that 
 
310. Id. at 13 (“Since the 1970s, income inequality in the United States has grown, with the 
upper tail of the income distribution pulling away from the rest . . . .  More unequal 
places also tend to be more segregated . . . .”). 
311. See Chaskin & Joseph, supra note 267, at 232. (“[Because of the] relationship between 
diversity and social cohesion[,] [t]he intentional diversity of unit type, income, and 
housing tenure status in [mixed-income] contexts has led to a population characterized 
by . . . fairly extreme social distances, throwing the challenges of creating social cohesion 
and interaction among a heterogeneous population into stark relief.”). 
312. Ellickson, supra note 9, at 1009 (observing that “the choice of the optimal social milieu 
for the pursuit of economic integration . . . is a difficult one” and noting with approval 
that the first Mount Laurel decision only required inclusionary housing at selected 
locations within a city’s boundaries while “explicitly bless[ing] the use of zoning to set 
aside some neighborhoods as exclusive”). 
313. Calmore, supra note 154, at 1505–06 (“It is rare for blacks and whites to experience both 
integrated housing and a sense of community.  Blacks demonstrate a history of 
integrating for a better housing package, not in quest of community.  Integrated housing 
seldom represents ‘a path to belonging.’ It is usually at the expense of community that 
blacks improve their housing package in integrated settings dominated by whites.  The 
integration imperative is predicated on white dominance and virtual assimilation by blacks as 
preconditions to whites accepting blacks into their communities.”).  
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mixed-income housing in our national milieu plays the role of discrimination 
management.  Mixed-income housing may cost more,  may not be hospitable, 
and may be based on social superiority, but it has been deployed as a way to 
avoid middle- and upper middle-class opposition to low-income housing.  
This very feature is the obstacle to its success.  As mixed-income housing 
incorporates the features of what it takes to avoid discrimination, it also takes 
on other discriminatory assumptions in order to do so.  Managing 
discrimination requires taking on the mindset of those who would 
discriminate, allowing the discriminator’s perspective to permeate the choice and 
design of mixed-income housing.  Thus, the mixed-income model subordinates as 
it tries to provide a door of opportunity for those seeking to escape concentrated 
poverty and access affordable, safe, advantageously located housing.  Perhaps 
this is inevitable, but it is worth noting in the hope that the ugly reflection in the 
mirror will allow us to see mixed-income housing for what it is.  We must not 
consider it impossible for low-income people to live in a attractive, healthy, 
affordable community of their own where they have valor and stature within 
the community. 
We also need more thought and discussion about protecting the desire 
for status through controlling or avoiding “others.”  We structure mixed-
income housing in a way that reflects not just the way the market rate tenant 
sees the world, but also how they see the lower-income resident.  We assume 
that exclusively high-income communities are acceptable.  Before the law 
accepts that assumption, it must acknowledge that the endeavor is filled with 
other assumptions that reflect social domination, rather than the amelioration 
of a social ill.  Discrimination may be inevitable, but instead of catering to it 
we need to own the source—our own discriminatory status assumptions—
and understand the different ways in which people obtain status.  Everyone 
needs the illusion of status.  Everyone needs a voice.  Everyone would like 
choice.  Accordingly, at the very least, an affordable housing development 
may properly consist of housing devoted solely to the needs of the lower 
income. 
CONCLUSION 
Mixed-income housing and its unexamined compromises around 
discrimination management reflect the tensions between the goals of 
inclusion within a society structured around the interests, and the preferences 
of the affluent, which often are for exclusion and separation.  As a policy, 
mixed-income housing policy disrupts the social meaning and expectations 
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of members of a society who are increasingly accustomed to thinking of 
themselves as customers entitled to what they can pay for.  This leads to the 
belief that money is the measure of who is desirable in a community, and who 
is so undesirable that they will ruin a community.  Ultimately, these 
expectations inform the policy about the number of poor and black people 
who can live in one development or one neighborhood and be socially 
desirable, and therefore economically sustainable over time.  Because mixed-
income policy surreptitiously addresses racial segregation under cover of the more 
politically expedient goal of economic integration, it renders racial subordination 
invisible.  The logic of the market at once naturalizes and makes invisible negative 
racial outcomes.  Thus, mixed-income housing may be appropriate at some times 
and in some places.  This Article debunks the given justifications of social 
mixing, role modeling, and social control.  So, is there a good justification?  When 
and how should discrimination be managed? 
The beginnings of an answer comes from social domination theory 
which neutrally observes that any society is characterized by social 
domination manifesting according to the culture and history of a particular 
society.314  Sidanius and Pratto have categorized societal practices as either 
domination enhancing (DE) and domination ameliorating (DA) practices.315  
Mixed-income housing is perceived and promoted as a domination 
ameliorating practice, but as this Article has demonstrated mixed-income 
housing is a technique for accommodating or enhancing, rather than 
ameliorating, discrimination.  The lesson for mixed-income housing from 
social domination theory is to scrutinize mixed-income housing policy, and 
indeed, all housing policy, for its domination enhancing and domination 
ameliorating characteristics.  The insight of discrimination management is 
that it provides a way to change the focus on practices that we think are 
domination ameliorating but are actually better characterized as domination 
enhancing.  Further empirical study is required to explore how to evaluate the 
balance.  The poor door controversy arose within a mixed-income housing 
scheme whose purpose was to ameliorate hierarchy by providing centrally 
located housing to those in need.  The poor doors attempted to sidestep 
discrimination, while catering to it. 
Until we acknowledge the tension between our stated desires for 
inclusion and the public and private practices of exclusion through a market 
economy that sells status through exclusion, we will continue to craft policies 
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that vacillate between two extremes.  Announcements of the latest luxury high 
rise development and the concentration of affluence it represents contrast with 
stories of where the displaced end up—neighborhoods characterized by the 
seemingly separate phenomenon of poverty, which leads to violent crime, 
homelessness, and police brutality.316  The occurrence of both phenomena 
simultaneously tells us that gentrification’s concentration of wealth presents 
a problem of cultural dominance of elites and the reordering of society’s 
amenities to meet their needs exclusively.  As of this writing, mixed-income 
housing may be our best hope, but if it is, segregation and the shortage of 
affordable housing will continue to be the problems we fail to overcome.  
 
316. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Fragile Baltimore Struggles to Heal After Deadly Police 
Encounter, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/21/us/a-
fragile-baltimore-struggles-to-heal-itself.html [https://perma.cc/H3XU-YU5K]. 
